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ABSTRACT 
In this dissertation a formalisation of nonmonotonic reasoning, namely Default logic, is discussed. 
A proof theory for default logic and a variant of Default logic - Prioritised Default logic - is 
presented. We also pursue an investigation into the relationship between default reasoning and 
making inferences in a neural network. The inference problem shifts from the logical problem in 
Default logic to the optimisation problem in neural networks, in which maximum consistency isc_ -
aimed at The inference is realised as an adaptation process that identifies and resolves conflicts 
between existing knowledge about the relevant world and external information. Knowledge and 
data are transformed into constraint equations and the nodes in the network represent 
propositions and constraint equations. The violation of constraints is formulated in terms of an 
energy function. The Hopfield network is shown to be suitable for modelling optimisation 
problems and default reasoning 
Key terms: 
Default logic; normal default theories; Resolution theorem proving; neural networks; penalty 
logic; Hopfield network; training algorithm; nonmonotonic inferences; expectations; connectionist 
inference mechanism; conflict resolution strategies 
v 
PREFACE 
This dissertation gives an exposition of Default logic, which is to a large extent devoted to an 
investigation ofReiter's [24] theory of default reasoning. Also included is an overview of neural 
networks and an investigation of modelling default reasoning in neural networks. 
Chapter I presents a brief discussion of nonmonotonic reasoning in general and default logic is 
introduced as one of the formalisations of nonmonotonic logic. 
Chapter 2 gives a detailed discussion of Default logic supported by a number of examples. 
Chapter 3 presents a proof theory for default logic. A variant of default logic, namely Prioritised 
default logic is discussed based on Mengin' s [ 17] approach. Conflicts among defaults are shown 
to be resolved using extended clauses and new resolution rules together with classical resolution 
rules. 
In Chapter 4 neural networks are introduced. The functioning of neural nets is compared to the 
functioning of the human brain and different architectures of neural nets are discussed. Learning 
algorithms, activation functions, energy functions and weights are defined and discussed. The TSP 
is discussed as an example of an optimisation problem. In this chapter mathmatical knowledge 
of equations of motions and partial derivatives is assumed. 
Finally in Chapter 5 we describe the relationship between default reasoning and the inferencing 
in a neural network. This discussion is based primarily on the work of Pinkas [21] who introduced 
Penalty logic as a framework for representing nonmonotonic logic, and Narazaki and Ralescu [ 19] 
who proposed a connectionist inference method for a knowledge base containing default 
knowledge. A number of examples are given in terms of representation in neural networks. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Reasoning is a fundamental component of intelligence. Therefore artificial intelligence 
requires programs with the ability to reason. To this end the study of models of reasoning 
is a major focus in artificial intelligence (AI) research. 
Earlier studies in artificial intelligence was based on a type of reasoning that could be 
modelled by classical logic. A set of beliefs are given about the world and with reasoning 
methods such as mathematical deduction, induction or resolution theorem proving, 
conclusions are derived which extend the set of beliefs about the world. Previous beliefs 
can never be retracted. We refer to this type of reasoning as monotonic. Classical logic 
deals with statements that are wholly true or wholly false. Therefore uncertain knowledge 
or common sense assumptions cannot be represented in classical logic. 
When building an intelligent system, the aim is to make the system resemble the 
reasoning displayed by humans as closely as possible. However, human reasoning is 
much more complex than what classical logic can support. Hence another form of 
reasoning is incorporated in the realm of artificial intelligence, namely nonmonotonic 
reasoning. This type of reasoning has overcome many of the limitations of classical logic, 
in that it uses methods of deduction and retraction of beliefs that are closer to human 
reasoning. It allows assumptions to be made which can later be retracted in the light of 
newly acquired facts. Cognitive behaviour is the result of much computational activity. 
In [28] Lokendra Shastri highlights these cognitive behaviour patterns by identifying two 
different kinds of inference: 
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1. Reflexive inference, which is almost immediate reaction where the agent is not 
conscious of the steps involved in arriving at a conclusion. lbis is a very quick procedure. 
An example of reflexive inference is when one makes a subconscious decision concerning 
the meaning of a word. 
2. Reflective inference; this type of inference is deliberate and relatively slow. Here the 
agent is aware of the steps involved in arriving at a conclusion. For example the task of 
adding 567 to 895. 
In order to simulate human reasoning accurately we need to allow for both these types of 
inference. Clearly human reasoning is a very complex process which is nonmonotonic in 
nature. 
AI strives to emulate the reasoning patterns of humans. Many approaches have been 
developed, which use a pure logicist view. Theories have been developed to support the 
nonmonotonic nature of commonsense reasoning and a number of formalisations for 
nonmonotonic reasoning have been developed. In this dissertation one such formalisation, 
namely Default logic, will be discussed. We will show how neural networks are able to 
emulate the basic functioning of the brain. Finally we investigate whether symbolic 
representations of propositions can be implemented in neural networks and whether these 
networks can perform the kind of inferences required for default reasoning. 
A complete description of Default logic is presented in chapter 2. Chapter 3 describes the 
proof theory used in default reasoning and the prioritization of defaults (in case of 
conflict) to acquire a minimal set of extensions. In chapter 4 the charateristics and 
architecture of neural networks are presented, showing the close resemblance to the 
human brain. Finally, chapter 5 describes the possibility of simulating default reasoning 
in a neural network. 
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2 DEFAULT LOGIC 
2.1 Introduction 
It often happens that one may reason about a set of beliefs (incompletely specified world) 
and derive conclusions which are plausible, but which can become contradictory at a 
later stage when new information come to light. Previous beliefs may need to be 
retracted, which means that the database of beliefs does not expand monotonically. This 
type of reasoning is therefore said to be nonmonotonic. Nonmonotonic reasoning makes 
use of non-sound inferences. We say that an inference procedure is sound if any sentence 
that can be derived from a belief set using that inference procedure is logically implied 
by that belief set [24]. In other words, inference rules used in this type of reasoning 
allows one to make temporary or rather default assumptions which are not necessarily 
logically implied by the belief set. 
In order to apply nonmonotonic reasoning successfully in AI, it needs to be formalised. 
There are a number of ways of formalising nonmonotonic reasoning. These include 
circumscription [18], predicate completion [3], the closed world assumption [24] and 
Default logic [26]. In Default logic, the deduction rules are represented by special 
linguistic expressions called defaults. The rest of this chapter is devoted to Default logic. 
2.2 Default rules and Default theories 
Before we deal with the formalisation of Default logic in detail, we need to discuss the 
underlying terminology and concepts. 
2.2.1 Defaults 
Defaults are rules of the form A(x): B(x) 
------------C ( x) 
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, where A,B and C 
are first-order 
predicates, 
A(x) is the prerequisite, B(x) the justification, and C(x) the consequent. 
A default such as, 
North(x):Is_ Cold(x) 
Is_Cold(x) 
is interpreted as: for any place x, if xis in the North and it is consistent with our current 
set of beliefs to assume that x is cold, then add this fact to the belief set. In this default, 
North(x) is referred to as the prerequisite, the top Is_Cold(x) is the justification and the 
bottom Is_Cold(x) the consequent. 
The justification and the consequent may be different predicates, and the prerequisite can 
be omitted. In the latter case the only requirement for applicability of the default is that 
the justification is consistent with the current belief set. The justification may consist of 
more than one wff (short for well-formed formula), for example, A(x):B1(x),Bi(x) 
---------------------C( x) 
where it would be required that both B1(x) and Bi{x) are consistent with the current belief 
set. 
2.2.2 Default Theories 
The main elements of Default logic are pairs consisting of a set of wffs, the axioms 
(denoted by W), and a set of defaults (denoted by D). Such a pair is referred to as a 
default theory (T), which represents factual and common sense knowledge about the 
specific world that is involved. We write T = <W,D>, where W is the set of axioms and 
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D the set of defaults. 
Example 2.1 
Consider the theory T consisting of the axioms, 
ls_ Hot(x) and Is_ Raining(x) and the default 
Is_ Hot(x):Humid(x) 
Humid(x). 
Now, W = {Is_Hot(x),Is_Raining(x)}, 
D = {Is Hot(x):Humid(x) } __ ::. ___________________ _ 
Humid(x) 
T=<W,D>. 
and 
a 
A default is said to be open if it contains at least one free variable, i.e. a variable that does 
not appear within the scope of a universal quantifier (\I) or an existential quantitfier (:3). 
For example, 
Bird(x):Can _ fly(x) 
Can_fly(x) 
is an open default, since x is free. In other words x is not the x in \Ix or ::Jx. A default is 
closed ifit contains no free variables. Some examples of closed defaults are: 
1. :Hot in Summer 
Hot in Summer 
This represents the rule that if it is consistent 
with current beliefs that it is Hot in Summer 
then add Hot_in_Surnmer to the set-ofbeliefs. 
2. Bird(Tweety): Can_fly(Tweety), where Tweety is a constant. This 
represents the rule that if Tweety is 
a bird and it is consistent to believe Can_ fly(Tweety) 
that Tweety can fly, then add that belief 
to the theory. 
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2.3 Open defaults and their instances 
Open defaults represent general inference rules which can be applied to different objects 
or individuals in the world that we are working with. For convenience sometimes the 
defaults will be written on one line. As we've said above, a default 
A(x):B1(x), ... ,B.(x)/C(x) is open if and only if at least one of A(x),Bi (x), .. .,&c(x), C(x) 
contains a free variable. A default the01y T is said to be open iff it contains at least one 
open default. 
A term is a constant, or a variable, or the result of applying some function of the 
underlying first-order language to an existing term. A ground term is a term that contains 
no variables. We can obtain an instance of an open default by replacing its free variables 
with ground terms. This means that an instance is a closed default. We can identify an 
open default with the set of all its instances, obtained by using all the possible ground 
terms in the language as replacement for the free variables. For now we assume that there 
are finitely many ground terms. Example 2.2 clarifies this. 
By replacing each open default theory T with its corresponding set of instances, we get 
a closed default theory CLOSED(T) [ 17), thereby eliminating open defaults. Every open 
default theory T can thus be mapped into a closed theory CLOSED(T). In this discussion 
we focus on closed theories in particular. 
Example 2.2 
Suppose the theory T consists of: 
W = { Is_Married(Jim) A Is_Married(Tom) A Single(Joe)} 
and 
D= 
{
Is Married(x): Has Children(x) } _;: ____________________ :: ____________ _ 
Has_ Children(x) 
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The individuals that exist in the world which is modelled by T, are Jim, Tom and Joe. 
These individuals, or constants, are the ground terms of this theory. In keeping with the 
above explanation, one can identify the open default of T with the set of instances 
obtained by replacing x with Jim, Tom and Joe respectively. Consequently, the 
corresponding closed theory is: 
W = {Is_Married(Jim) /\ Is_Married(Tom) /\ Single(Joe)} 
D = { Is Married(Jim): Has Children(Jim) 
--::----------------------=--------------Has_ Children( Jim) 
ls_ Married(Tom): Has_ Children(Tom) 
Has_ Children(Tom) 
~~=~~-:~~!.~:L.~~~--:~~~~~~-C!.~e) } 
Has_ Children( Joe) 
The third default will never be applied, since it cannot be inferred that Joe is married and 
so the prerequisite does not hold. The conclusion that Joe has children is plausible only 
if he was married. In the world represented in this example single persons are not 
expected to have children. This is however the domain of people's choices and morals, 
with which this specific world is not concerned. a 
2.4 Closed default theories 
A default theory <W,D> is closediff every default ofD is closed [26]. According to [17], 
a closed default theory, written CLOSED(T) and referred to as the closure of T, can be 
obtained by the following construction: 
(I) IfT is closed, then put CLOSED(T) = T, else 
(2) Replace T by its Skolemized form (explained below) and denote the resulting 
theory by T 1• 
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(3) Let T2 be the theory obtained from T, by replacing each of its open defaults by 
the set of their instances over TERMS(T,), where TERMS(T1) is the set of all 
ground terms constructable from D. 
The Skolemized form of a wff is obtained by replacing all existentially quantified 
variables with a Skolem function, i.e. a new function of which the arguments are the 
universally quantified variables preceding ::3 in the wff. When no such variables appear, 
the Skolem function is a new constant. The newly introduced Skolem function(s) or 
constant(s) must all differ and must differ from existing functions in T. Finally remove 
the existential quantifier. For example, consider the wff ('ix (::3y Loves(x,y))). We must 
remove the existential quantifiers. Here the existential quantifier is within the scope of 
the universal quantifier. In this case the existential variable y depends on the value of the 
universal variable x. Therefore we drop the existential quantifier and replace the variable 
y with a term which is a function ofx. We now have 'ix Loves(x,f(x)), where f(x) is a 
Skolem function. 
To get the Skolemized form of a theory T, the axioms in W and the consequents of the 
defaults in D must all be Skolemized (where Skolemization is applicable). 
2.5 The extension of a default theory 
Since we cannot know everything about the specific world involved, as implied in the 
introduction to this chapter, there will be gaps in our knowledge. Our belief set will be 
an incomplete collection of facts about this world. However, there will arise situations 
in which inferences have to be made despite the incompleteness of the knowledge base. 
The introduction of defaults allows us to extend the incomplete knowledge base. This 
extension of the incomplete theory is the crucial part of Default logic. 
A theory T can be extended to form the extension Eby including new beliefs (wffs) 
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obtained in one of two ways: they are inferred from axioms in W by applying deduction 
rules such as modus ponens of classical logic, or they are the result of successfully 
applying defaults in D. Note that a default is applicable with respect to a belief set S iff 
S logically implies the prerequisite of the default and S does not logically imply the 
negation of the justification of the default. 
Example 2.3 
Consider the theory T consisting of the axiom, 
Cricketer(Stanton) and the defaults 
Cricketer(x):Tall(x) 
-----------------------
and 
Cricketer( x): Healthy( x) 
--------------------------Tall( x) Healthy( x) 
By the first default, Stanton is tall; by the second, Stanton is healthy. Since both these 
defaults can be applied simultaneously, that is, after applying one, the other is still 
applicable, T gives rise to one extension which is given by 
E= {Cricketer( Stanton), Tall(Stanton),Healthy(Stanton)}. 
E is a set of sentences closed under logical implication with respect to ordinary logic. 
Therefore the extension E is more accurately written as 
E=Th( { Cricketer(Stanton), Tall(Stanton),Healthy(Stanton)} ), where Th refers to the 
logical closure of the sentences in the set. a 
Let T' be the theory obtained by adding the axiom ~(Tall(Stanton) /\Healthy (Stanton)) 
to W. This says that Stanton can be either Tall or Healthy, but not both. Now, ifthe first 
default is applied, we infer that Stanton is tall, but the application of the second default 
is blocked. That is, to apply the second default, we must first check that the prerequisite, 
Cricketer(Stanton), holds. This is fine. The next step is to check whether the justification, 
Healthy(Stanton), is consistent with the current set of beliefs. So far we have 
Th( { Cricketer(Stanton),~(Tall(Stanton) /\ Healthy(Stanton)), Tall( Stanton)}) . 
From ~(Tall(Stanton) /\ Healthy(Stanton)) and Tall(Stanton), we can infer 
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~Healthy(Stanton). Hence the justification of the second default is not consistent with this 
set of beliefs. If, however, the second default is applied first, we infer that Stanton is 
healthy, and this blocks the application of the first default in a similar way as explained 
above. The axiom added, means that either Stanton is tall or he is healthy, but not both. 
So, applying the two defaults in different orders gives rise to two different extensions of 
T', namely 
E1 =Th( {Cricketer(Stanton), ~(Tall(Stanton) A Healthy(Stanton)),Tall(Stanton)}) 
E2 =Th( {Cricketer( Stanton), ~(Tall(Stanton)A Healthy(Stanton)), Healthy( Stanton)}) 
The above discussion points out the following three conditions that must hold for an 
extension E [3,5]: 
(Cl) It should contain W, i.e. W c E. 
(C2) It should be deductively closed, i.e. Th(E) = E. 
(C3) If (A:B1, .. .,Bi)C)EO, AEE and ~B 1 $ E, .. .,~Bk $ E, then CEE. 
These are the closure conditions. In the above example we saw two different extensions 
emerge that satisfy the closure conditions. This brings us to the formal definition of an 
extension of a default theory, as given by Lukazewicz [ 17]. 
Definition of an extension 
Let T=<W,O> be a closed default theory over a first-order language L. For any set of 
sentences S !:: L, let r(S) be the smallest set of sentences from L satisfying the following 
properties: 
(01) r(S) = Th(r(S)) 
(02) W !:: r(S) 
(03) If (A:B1,. . .,Bi)C)EO, AEr(S) and ~st $S,. . .,~Bk $S, then CEf(S). 
Now, a set ofwffs E !:: Lis an extension ofT iffE=r(E). 
Consider example 2.3: The theory (T) gives rise to the minimal set which satisfy the 
closure properties. Ifwe apply properties 01, 02 and 03, where S=E, we get 
I I 
r(E)=Th({Cricketer(Stanton),Tall(Stanton), Healthy(Stanton)}) = E which means 
Eis an extension of the theory T. 
Consider another example. 
Example 2.4 
Let W= {Cricketer(Stanton)} and 
D= { ~?.~~~ii~~~~~~;~~~~~~~!~~?_n)} 
There are two sets which satisfy the closure conditions, Cl, C2 and C3 with respect to 
T. 
E, = Th( {Cricketer( Stanton), Tall(Stanton)}) 
E2 =Th( {Cricketer(Stanton), ~Tall(Stanton)} ). 
Applying Dl, D2 and D3 with S= E, and S=E2 respectively, we obtain 
r(E,) = Th({Cricketer(Stanton),Tall(Stanton)}) = E1 
r(E2) = Th({ Cricketer( Stanton)}) * E2 
So only E1 is an extension ofT. 
To build up r(E2), we must first apply Dl and D2 to get Th({Cricketer(Stanton)}). Then 
we apply D3: There is only one default, namely 
Cricketer(Stanton):Tall(Stanton)/Tall(Stanton). First we must check whether 
Cricketer(Stanton) is in r(E2). At this stage r(E2)= Th( { Cricketer(Stanton)} ), which 
means the condition AE r(S) holds. Now, does the second condition, ~B1 lfS, .. .,~Bk lfS, 
hold? For our example the condition translates to ~Tall(Stanton) If E2. But ~Tall(Stanton) 
does appear in Ez, so we cannot add the consequent of the default to r(E2). a 
While it is important to find an extension which further completes an incomplete database 
of knowledge represented by a default theory, there are theories which do not have an 
extension. For example, suppose a theory T consists of the empty set of axioms and one 
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admittedly nonsensical default, 
:Spherical(Earth) 
d = -------------------~spherical(Earth) . 
The following set satisfies the closure conditions C 1, C2 and C3: E = 
Th({~Spherical(Earth)}). Ifwe apply Dl, D2 and D3 to Ewe get I'(E)={}. This is 
because ~Spherical(Earth) is an element ofE (so the last condition of D3 is not met). We 
see that E * I'(E) which means that Eis not an extension of T. The only other possible 
extension is E2=Th( { Spherical(Earth), ~Spherical(Earth)} ). Since this set contains a 
contradiction, the closure consists of all possible wffs. E2 does not satisfy the closure 
conditions. In particular condition C3 is not satisfied, since the condition,~B1 ffE, ... ,~Bk 
ffE does not hold. In this example the condition translates to ~Spherical(Earth) ff E2• But 
~Spherical(Earth) does appear in E2 . Hence E2 will not satisfy the definition of an 
extension, which means T does not have an extension. 
Similarly, the next example depicts a theory that has no extension. 
Example 2.5 
Consider the theory T= <W,D>, where 
W = {~In_hospital(Jack) /\ Sick(Jack)} 
D = { S~~~~~~~-~~-~=~~:-~~~~~~~-~~) } 
In_ hospital( Jack) . 
In this case the consequent, In_hospital(Jack), of the default denies the axiom. If the 
default is not applied, then there is no way to derive In_hospital(Jack). But if we follow 
C3 strictly we are forced to apply the default which, after its application, becomes 
inapplicable, since the consequent will cause a contradiction in the belief set. To show 
that T lacks an extension, let's consider the only two possibilities. 
E, = Th({~In_hospital(Jack) /\ Sick(Jack)}) and 
E2 = Th( {~In_ hospital(Jack) /\ Sick( Jack), In_ hospital( Jack)}). 
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Since all three conditions of DJ hold, In_hospital(Jack) is added to I'(E2), i.e. I'(E2) = 
Th({~In_hospital(Jack) A Sick(Jack), In_hospital(Jack)}). We see that r(E1) * E1. E2 
contains all possible wffs because it contains a contradiction. So the third condition of 
D3, i.e. -B ff E2 does not hold and therefore ln_hospital(Jack) is not added to I'(E2). 
I'(E2) = Th({~In_hospital(Jack) A Sick(Jack)}). We obseive again that I'(E2) * E,. 
Therefore neither E1 nor E2 are extensions of T, which means that T has no extension. 
a 
The fact that there exist default theories that do not have extensions, is not very 
supportive of a general theory of default reasoning. It is therefore desirable to restrict 
attention to a class of theories which do have extensions [26]. These theories are referred 
to as normal default theories. 
2.6 Normal default theories 
Reiter [26] defines any default of the form 
A(x):B(x) 
as being normal. That is, where the justification and the 
consequent are the same. B(x) 
A normal default theory is one in which every default in Dis normal. One of the most 
important properties of normal default theories is that every closed normal default theory 
has an extension. 
Lukaszewicz [ 17] obseives that any closed normal default is a mapping from belief sets 
into belief sets. He gives a formal definition of this idea as follows: 
Let S be a belief set. To each closed normal default d1 = A:B/B we assign a mapping, 
denoted by d, given by 
{ 
Th(S u { B}) if d1 is applicable wrt S, where B is the consequent of d1• d(S) = · 
S otherwise. 
Sis interpreted as the set of beliefs before the application of the default d1, and d(S) is the 
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set of beliefs after the application of d, . 
Example 2.6 
The default d = Sick(Tom):In_Bed(Tom) 
In_Bed(Tom) is applicable wrt to 
S, =Th( {Sick(Tom)} ), and is inapplicable wrt to S2 =Th( {Sick(Jane) }). 
So d(S,)=Th({Sick(Tom), In_Bed(Tom)}) and d(S2) = S2 a 
We say that S is stable with respect to D, iff d(S) = S, for all d, ED. In other words S 
cannot be extended by applying defaults from D. In order to determine the required 
characteristics of extensions for closed normal default theories, we need to discuss the 
underlying terminology and concepts. 
Lukaszewicz [ 17] defines the term approachable as follows: 
Let W be a set of sentences and let D be a set of closed normal defaults. Assume further 
that Sis a belief set. We say that Sis approachable from W wrt D iff, for each belief set 
S, such that Wr=S1cS, there is a default dED such that S1cd(S1)r=S. Lukaszewicz [17] then 
defines the extension of closed normal default theories in the following theorem: 
Theorem 2.1 
Let T =<T,W> be a closed normal default theory and suppose that Eis a belief set. Then 
E is an extension of T iff 
(l)Wr=E; 
(2) E is stable wrt D; 
(3) Eis approachable from W wrt D. 
The proof can be found in [ 17]. 
The other important result of closed normal default theories 1s that they are 
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semirnonotonic, which means that adding more closed normal defaults to such a theory 
will never force the retraction of previously inferred beliefs. That is, if D, and 0 2 are sets 
of normal defaults and if E, is an extension for the theory T=<Di, W>, then the theory 
<D1uD2,W> has an extension E2 such that E,;;;; E,. To see why closed normal theories are 
sernirnonotonic and not monotonic, we 1 ook at a similar situation of adding more axioms 
to W. lfW, andW, are sets of axioms, and if E, is an extension for the theory T=<D,W,>, 
it does not necessarily follow that the theory <D,W1uW2 >has an extension E2 such that 
E1 ;;;; E2. 
Most default rules can be naturally represented as normal default rules [25]. However, 
if there are more than one default, their interaction with each other may lead to 
unexpected or conflicting conclusions. For example, if we have two normal defaults such 
as A(x): B(x)/B(x) and B(x): C(x)/C(x), then one would like to infer by transitivity that 
if A(x) then C(x). To show that these interacting defaults can lead to conflicting or rather 
anomalous conclusions, consider this example. 
Example 2.7 
Suppose the following defaults exist in a theory. 
d1 = High_school_dropout(x): Adult(x) 
and 
Adult(x) 
d2 = Adult(x): Employed(x) 
Employed(x) 
From this one would conclude that "Typically high school dropouts are employed". 
This is not what we would like to believe. Transitivity has to be blocked. One solution 
to the problem is to modify the second default so as to block the transitivity. 
To this effect the second default is replaced by 
d3 = Adult(x): Employed(x) /\ ~ High_School_dropout(x) 
---------------------------------------------------------------Employed(x) 
Representing defaults in the above manner avoids inferences that goes against intuition. 
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Default d3 is not applicable to persons known to be dropouts. D 
The next section deals with the representation of normal default rules in a way that still 
maintain the intended interpretation but avoids the anornolous situation. The 
representation will also lead us to the notion of a semi-normal default theory. 
2.7 Semi-normal defaults 
Many nonrnonotonic rules, such as most of the examples we have seen so far, naturally 
have the form of a normal default. That is, 
A(x):B(x) 
d = ----------- . 
B(x) 
It is, however, not the case that all defaults can be rewritten in this form. Some defaults 
are not in a form that allows this, for example the default in example 2.5. In some cases 
where it seems as if the defaults can be represented in the normal form, there is still the 
problem where the interaction between the defaults makes the situation more complex. 
As we've seen in example 2.7, ifthe rule which is to be applied interacts with other 
default rules and/or axioms, then there may be some exceptional circumstances which 
make the rule application unacceptable. The following example should help to explain 
this further. 
Example 2.8 
Consider the following statements: 
Torn is poor. 
All poor candidates receive bursaries. 
Typically, if a candidate receives a bursary, he is intelligent. 
This can be represented by the following theory T: 
W = {Poor(Tom), 'efx Poor(x) - Receive_bursary(x)} 
D = { Receive_bursary(x): Intelligent(x)/Intelligent(x)} 
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The fact that Tom is poor should not be enough evidence that he is intelligent. But T 
forces this inference. Hence the transitivity from Poor via Receive_ burs!ll)' to Intelligent 
must be blocked somehow, while still preserving the intended interpretation. Lukaszewicz 
[ 16] suggests replacing the default by the non-normal default 
Receive_burs!ll)'(x):Intelligent(x) /\ ~Poor(x) 
---------------------------------------------------Intelligent( x) a 
The criterion of applying the replaced default is stronger than that of the original default, 
thus avoiding an anomalous situation. Depending on the context, the rule may be 
inapplicable because of the strong justification that is required. In general, the exceptional 
circumstances are denoted by E(x), and the rule can now be 
represented as A(x):B(x)ll~E(x) . 
A default of the form 
A(x):B(x) /\ C(x) . 
B(x) 
------------------- IS B(x) 
called semi-normal. It is possible to express a single-justification default by means of a 
semi-normal default, provided that the single-justification default correctly models a 
commonsense world. According to Lukaszewicz [ 17] a default theory is semi-normal iff 
all of its defaults are semi-normal. The class of semi-normal defaults includes normal 
defaults, since any normal default A:B/B may be identified with the semi-normal default 
A:B /\ True/B. 
Lukaszewicz [ 17] investigates the adequacy of semi-normal defaults. That is, 
l. Are semi-normal defaults sufficient to cover all practical situations? 
2. To what degree can the effects of semi-normal defaults be obtained within the 
structure of normal representation? 
These issues are addressed in [3,4]. There Lukaszewicz proposes a translation of an 
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arbitary single justification default into a normal default in two steps. This schema seems 
to work for a wide class of defaults. 
Step I A default of the form 
d = A(x):B(x) 1s 
C(x) 
replaced by the semi-normal default 
d1 = A(x):B(x) /\ C(x) 
--------------------C( x) 
Note that the applicability criterion, that is, the justification, is stronger in d1. 
Step 2 The semi-normal default, 
d1 = A(x):B(x) /\ C(x) 
---------------------C( x) 
is replaced by the normal default 
d2 = A(x):B(x) /\ C(x) 
B(x) /\ C(x) 
It is however possible to find practical situations where the second step does not work. 
The following commonsense example illustrates this point. 
Example 2.9 
Let d = Depressed(x): Eating_disorders(x) 
------------------------------------------Over_ weight( x) 
As a first step we replace d by 
d1 = Depressed(x): Eating_disorders(x) /\ Over_weight(x) 
Over_ weight(x) 
Replacing d1 by 
d2 = Depressed(x): Eating_disorders(x) /\ Over_weight(x) 
Eating disorders(x) /\ Over_weight(x) 
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can clearly lead to unsupported beliefs. The statement, "Typically a depressed person 
with eating disorders is overweight", is not acceptable. a 
The following example given by Lukaszewicz [ 17], shows that there are cases where it 
can work: 
d1 = Adult(x):Employed(x) /\ ~Dropout(x) 
Employed(x) 
Applying the translation process, we replace d1 by 
d2 = Adult(x):Employed(x) /\ ~Dropout(x) 
Employed(x) /\ ~Dropout(x) 
Here the consequent of d2 is stronger than that of dh but still leads to a plausible belief. 
The examples discussed above indicate that in general single-justification defaults that 
model a commonsense setting may be reasonably expressed by means of semi-normal 
defaults. Transforming semi-normal defaults to its normal representation is plausible only 
if the the condition "typically, if A(x) and C(x), then B(x) is fulfilled. 
We now turn to the crucial aspects of semi-normal default theories. 
2.8 Extensions of semi-normal default theories 
In the foregoing discussion, among the properties of normal default theories observed, 
one important result was highlighted, namely that every closed normal theory has an 
extension. Another important aspect is that closed normal theories are semi-monotonic. 
Semi-normal default theories, on the other hand, lack these two properties. The lack of 
semi-monotonicity can be illustrated by the following example taken from [17]: 
Example 2.10 
Let T = <{R(a)}, {R(a):P(a) /\ Q(a)/Q(a)}> 
T has the extension E = Th({R(a), Q(a)}). 
By adding the default :~P(a)/ ~P(a), we obtain a new theory which has the extension F= 
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Th({R(a),~P(a)}). Clearly E ct: F, which shows that Tis not semi-monotonic. D 
In other words any belief derivable from a semi-no1mal default theory T can be 
invalidated by augmenting T by a new set of closed defaults. 
The next example from [ 17] illustrates the possible lack of an extension of a semi-n01mal 
theoty. 
Example 2.11 
Consider the theoty T consisting of the empty set of axioms and the following defaults: 
di = :p/\ ~q d1 = :q /\ ~r d3 = :r /\ ~p 
~q ~r ~ 
If dt is applied then T forces d3 to be applied, the result of which contradicts the 
justification of d,. Similarly if d2 is applied then T forces the application of d" the result 
of which contradicts the justification of cl,. One would observe that a similar contradiction 
occurs if d3 is applied first. D 
This illustrates that semi-normal theories do not necessarily have extensions. In general 
the lack of an extension is always the result of a conflict arising from the requirement to 
apply a default which cannot be applied. In the case of semi-normal default theories only 
the "non-normal" part of the justification of a default that has been applied would be a 
potential conflict with other defaults. 
Etherington (9] provides a sufficient condition that guarantees the existence of an 
extension of a subclass of semi-normal default theories. This involves the introduction 
of new concepts which we shall not pursue any further in this dissertation. 
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2.9 Semantics for Default logic 
Although he did not cover the semantics of Default logic in detaiL Reiter [26] gives the 
following model theoretic definition of an extension: the models of W must be restricted 
by D, so that those models satisfy all (and only) the wffs of an extension for the theory 
involved. In this section we pursue this idea by briefly discussing a semantics for Default 
logic that was first proposed by Lukaszewicz [ 17]. The discussion below is for the most 
part based on [27]. We focus on the semantics of closed default theories. In order to 
understand the discussion some terminology needs to be explained. 
2.9.1 Preliminaries 
An interpretation I that satisfies a sentence a for all variable assignments is said to be a 
model of a. This means that I "' a, iff 1 .. a for all variable assignments. Let X be a set 
of frrst-order models. A formula a is X-valid iff a is true in all models in X. A formula 
a is X-satisjiable iff a is true in some model in X. A closed normal default a:w/w is X-
applicable iff a (the prerequisite) is X-valid and w (the consequent) is X-satisfiable. 
2.9.2 A semantics for closed default systems 
As mentioned above, Reiter [26] views defaults of a theory <W,D> as restricting the 
models of W in such a way that: 
I) Any restricted class of models of W is the class of all models of some extension 
of<W, D>. 
2) If E is any extension of <W ,D>, then there is some such restricted class of models of 
W which is the class of all models of E. 
Since the application of a default yields a possible new axiom (the consequent), defaults 
can be viewed as operators which transform theories. If an agent chooses a default at each 
step of reasoning and applies it to the current set of models, X (the belief set), a new set, 
d(X) (where dis the mapping defined in section 2.6 on normal default theories), results. 
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The new set of beliefs is the set of all d(X)-valid formulas. If this process is repeated 
many times, it may happen that the current set of models become stable. That is, for each 
deD, d(X) = X. This means that X cannot be extended further by applying defaults from 
D. Each closed normal default can be regarded as a mapping from a set of models into 
a set of models. 
Formally we denote the resulting set of models by <di> X, where <d; > is the sequence of 
defaults being applied. The resulting consequents of the applied defaults are w1 , .. ,wi. 
Hence <di >Xis the set of models for Th(W u{w1 , .. ,wi }). The stable set of models for 
a default theory provides a semantic interpretation for the theory. This brings two 
important theorems to light: 
Theorem 2.2 
Let A be a closed normal default theory, and suppose that the set of models Y is stable 
with respect to A. Then Y is the set of all models for some extension for A. 
Example 2.12 
Consider the theory A=<W,D>, where 
W ={Bird(Tweety)} 
D= { Bird(x):Fly(x)/Fly(x)} 
The possible world modelled by the theory A, is a model ofW. The model of A is 
X,, = {Bird={Tweety}, Fly={Tweety} }, there is only one possible variable assignment 
i.e., x= Tweety. The default is )(,,-applicable since the prequisite Bird(Tweety) is true 
in X,, and the consequent Fly(Tweety) is )(,,-satisfiable. 
In this particular case there is just one model in X. Y = d(X,,) = X,, since the consequent 
is true in all (only one in this case) the models in Xo. The set of models <d; > Y, is stable 
with respect to A, since d(Y) = Y. Furthermore, A has one extension, E= 
Th( {Bird(Tweety),Fly(Tweety)} ). Hence Y is the set of model( s) for the extension of A.a 
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Theorem 2.3 
Let E be an extension for a closed normal default theory A= <W,D> and suppose that 
X is the set of all models for W, Y is the set of all models for E. Then Y is stable with 
respect to A. 
Let us again consider example 2.12. 
E =Th( {Bird(Tweety), Fly(Tweety)} ). Let Y be the set of model(s) for the extension, E 
of A. Let X be the set of models of W. As defaults from the set D are applied successfully 
it becomes true that d(X) = X. Therefore the resulting consequent is w, of the applied 
default. It follows therefore that since there is one default in this example, the consequent 
of d, that is Fly(Tweety), is represented by W; . Hence <d,> Xis the set of all model(s) for 
Th(W uFly(Tweety)). It then follows that <d;>X= X. But X = Y, since Y is the set of 
model(s) for the extension, E. There is just one model in this example. Therefore d(Y)=Y. 
Hence Y is stable with respect to A. 
To summarise: If we have a set of models, Xo, for a theory W, we obtain a semantic 
characterisation of an extension for W by satisfying the applicable defaults successively. 
At each step we make the consequent of a default X;-valid by taking away the models of 
X;. 1 in which it is false. Because Default logic for closed normal default theories is 
semimonotonic, each new consequent added, will be consistent with all those already 
added. 
Lukaszewicz's semantics for default theories is applicable only to closed normal default 
theories, and he admits that we require a semantics that covers more than normal defaults. 
He addressed the problem to a certain degree by translating non-normal defaults to 
normal defaults, as discussed earlier. Still, the Default logic proposed by Lukaszewicz has 
proved useful. Etherington [9] provides a backtracking mechanism to overcome the 
problem ofLukaszewicz's approach, which does not always lead to the set of models of 
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an extension. In [9] it is shown that individual defaults are not satisfied independently of 
the theory in which they occur. 
2.10 Conclusion 
Default logic is an important formalisation of commonsense reasoning. Determining 
whether a given default theory has an extension, is the main computational problem 
which is analogous to testing for validity and making deductions in classical logic. This 
makes default theories complex, since we are working with prototypical facts rather than 
"hard" facts about the world. Whenever a new default rule is added to a theory its 
possible interactions need to be analysed carefully, since it may lead to unacceptable 
conclusions. 
In this chapter we introduced Default logic. We explained the difference between open 
and closed default theories and described how a set of beliefs can be extended using 
default rules. A formal definition of extensions was given. We described a restricted class 
of default theories, normal default theories which has two useful properties that default 
theories do not have in general. These are that every such theory has an extension and 
that it is semimonotonic. We concluded the chapter by giving a very brief introduction 
to the semantics of Default logic. In the next chapter we continue the discussion of 
Default logic and specifically look at a proof theory for it. 
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3 A PROOF THEORY FOR DEFAULT LOGIC 
3.1 Introduction 
A first-order proof in classical logic is a sequence of wffs which are derived as a result 
of applying rules of inference such as modus ponens and resolution, showing that a given 
wff (say p) is in the knowledge base. Default logic is a formalisation of nonmonotonic 
logic that was first introduced by Reiter [26]. In addition to first-order wffs (W), a default 
theory (T) includes a set of default rules (D) for making default assumptions that may 
have to be retracted when new wffs that contradict these assumptions are added to the 
theory. In Default logic the current set of beliefs (which may include retractable beliefs) 
is represented by some extension of the theory. The purpose of a default proof theory 
would thus be to determine whether a given wff P in the language that underlies the 
theory, is an element of such an extension. 
Finding an extension of a default theory is central to Default logic, as an extension gives 
us a set of all possible beliefs that can be derived from the theory. Once we have an 
extension, we would typically want to determine whether a given sentence PEL (the 
language that underlies the theory), is an element of the extension. In determining 
whether p is in the current belief set (extension), we actually construct a default proof. 
Intuitively a default proof of p is a sequence of steps (applications of defaults which are 
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elements ofD) that, when applied in the particular sequence, yields the closed wff p. The 
proof theory described below is specific to closed normal default theories. The formal 
definition of a default proof of a wff, given by Reiter [10] follows. 
3.2 Default proof theory for closed normal default theories 
Definition 3.1 
Let T= <W,D> be a closed normal default theory and P a closed sentence from L. 
A default proof of ft with respect to Tis a finite sequence D0 , .•. ,Dk of finite subsets of D 
for which 
I. W u CONS(D0 ) ~ p 
2. For J,; i,; k, Wu CONS(D,) ~ PRE(D,_1) for all I,; i,; k. 
k 
4. W u u CONS(D;) is satisfiable and consistent with respect to W, 
i=O 
where PRE(D) and CONS(D) respectively denote the prerequisites and consequents of 
a set D of defaults. 
Example3.1 
This example was adapted from Besnard [I]. 
Consider the closed normal default theory where: 
I represents "It is hot". 
S represents "The sun is shining". 
G represents "Go swimming". 
U represents "Use sunscreen", and 
W = {U - I, U V S } 
D= { d1 = r:_.:~ _ _:_!0.~ 
I/\S ' 
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d3 =S/\G:U 
---u------' d. = ~-=~ } ~s 
Let us see how the above example fits the definition of a default proof of the wff, 
l/\U. 
Let D, = {}, D2 = {d1}, D1 = {d1, d2 } and D0 = {d3 }. 
Since 0 3 = {} we have WuCONS( {}) 1- PRE( {D2 }), i.e. {U - I, U V S} 1- IVS. 
Applying the set of defaults D2 = { d1 } yields Wu CONS( { d1}) 1- PRE( { D 1 }), i.e. {I !\ S, 
U =I, UV S} 1- (IVS)/\(1-S). 
Next we apply the set of defaults D1 = { di.d2} which yields Wu CONS( {di. d2}) 1-
PRE( {D0}), i.e. {U - I, UV S, I/\S, I-G}i- S/\G. In other words one can see that 
applying inference rules of classical logic yields the proposition S/\G. 
We then apply the set D0 ={d,} which yields WuCONS({ d3 }) 1- P (the goal clause), i.e. 
{U=I, UVS, l/\S, I-G, U} 1- I!\ U. U is the consequent of d3• Using modus ponens, we 
derive I. Therefore I/\U is logically entailed by Wu CONS({d3 }). 
Finally, we have WuCONS( {di. dz, d3 }) is consistent. 
We note that { d3}, { dh ~}, { d1 }, {} is a default proof of I/\U, since it satisfies all four 
conditions of the definition. l/\U is in the extension E =Th(Wu{U, l/\S, I-G} ). 
There is another default proof of I/\U with respect to <W,D>, which is { d4 },{}. Again if 
the definition is applied we find that it is indeed true that {UVS, U-1, ~S} 1- I/\U. D 
The default proof, P, of a wff pis the set(s) D0, .•• , Dk of all defaults which are invoked 
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in the proof in a certain order. This set of defaults is referred to the default support of p 
[26]. Ifwe refer to the proof of a specific wff p, we will denote the proof by Pp. We will 
now give a formal definition of this concept. 
Definition 3.2 
Suppose that P has a default proof Pp = D0, ... , Dk. The default support of this proof 
is defined to be DS(P p) = ~ D, . 
1=0 
Some observations with regard to the definition of a default support, DS(P): 
The set of defaults invoked in a default proof forms the basis of at least one extension; 
the fourth criterion of the definition of a default proof of a wff, p, is the same as the 
requirement that WuCONS(DS(Pp)) is consistent whenever W is. There is no clear 
method for choosing the sets D; in deriving a default proof. For instance, how do we 
choose subsets D; such that Wu CONS(D0) ~P? Do we pick subsets D; at random and 
test them? No, a method is required for such a proof, and we will discuss such a method 
in section 3 .4. 
Another problem with applying the definition is: how do we verify the satisfiability 
condition of the last criterion? 
3.3 Undecidability of extension membership 
In first order proof theory, the validity of a wff is semidecidable, i.e. there is a procedure 
which will confinn the validity of a wff if it is valid, but the procedure will fail to stop 
if the wff is not valid. A valid wff is one that is true in every interpretation of the specific 
world involved. However, the extension membership problem (i.e. given a closed default 
theory T and a closed wff p E L, is there an extension for T which contains P?) is 
undecidable. In other words, it is not always possible to derive a default proof, even if we 
know one exists. This is so because the fourth condition of the definition involves 
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showing that some set ofwffs is satisfiable (i.e. true in some interpretation). There is no 
algorithm that can guarantee that it will always verify that a satisfiable wff is indeed 
satisfiable. 
The fact that the proof procedure of a wff is semidecidable for first-order theoiy and the 
provability of a wff in Default logic is undecidable shows a major difference between 
first-order theoiy and Default logic. In order to compute a proof procedure for closed 
normal default theories, we have to depend upon a process which is not semidecidable. 
Hence there will be some heuristics involved in the computation. This heuristic 
component may sometimes lead to incorrect or mistaken beliefs [26]. This idea impinges 
upon the computation based on neural networks which is the subject of the next chapter. 
With this in mind, Reiter [26] introduces default proofs, both top down and bottom up 
procedures, using a resolution theorem prover. 
3.4 Deriving default proofs 
The approach followed here is the one that Reiter uses, namely a top-down approach to 
find default proofs. It starts with the goal clause to be proved and reasons backwards until 
a suitable set of premises is reached, which is veiy much like back-chaining ( subgoaling) 
in conventional proof procedures. 
3.4.1 Resolution theorem proving 
In classical logic, proof of a sentence P involves the application of inference rules such 
as modus ponens and the resolution principle. Reiter uses the resolution principle in his 
proof theoiy for Default logic. 
The basic idea behind resolution is: If we know that P is true or Q is true, and we also 
know that P is false or R is true, then it must be the case that Q is true or that R is true. 
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In implementing the resolution inference rule, two important processes must be 
performed, namely conversion of the wffs involved to clausal form, and unification. A 
wff is said to be in clausal form if it is a disjunction of wffs, each of which is either an 
atomic formula or a negation of an atomic formula (If P is an n-ary predicate symbol and 
ti.t2,. . .,t, are terms of a language L then P( ti.t,, ... ,t,,) is an atomic formula). Unification 
is the result of instantiating the variables with terms of the language that underlies the 
theory involved. The inference rule is then applied by finding in the set of clauses, a pair 
of clauses which contain complementary literals. This pair of clauses (called the parent 
clauses) are resolved by removing the complementary literals. The remaining literals are 
then combined disjunctively to form a new clause, called the resolvent. If a pair of clauses 
cannot be resolved because it contains no literals that are complementary, then 
unification (substituting the appropriate terms for the variables) may make the literals 
complementary. The resolution rule can then be applied in the usual way. It is important 
that the particular substitution of variables be maintained in further applications of the 
resolution rule. 
There are a number of resolution strategies that can be used to make the resolution 
principle more efficient. Using these, redundant or useless inferences are avoided. Some 
examples of these strategies are input resolution, unit resolution, linear resolution, 
deletion strategies and set-of support resolution. These are first-order proof procedures, 
and use of any of them requires the wffs to be in clausal form. A procedure to convert 
a logical expression to clausal form follows. 
Firstly, all implication operators, - , -=, and - are removed, by substituting equivalent 
sentences involving only the~./\, and V operators. For example, A-Bis equivalent to 
~AVB. Next, negations are distributed over other logical operators until each such 
operator applies to a single atomic sentence. For example ~AVB) is equivalent to 
~All~B. Thirdly, variables are renamed so that each quantifier has an unique variable. 
This can be illustrated by the following example. ( \:ix P(x,x)) /\ (3x Q(x)) can be 
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replaced by (Vx P(x,x)) /\ (:3y Q(y)). In the fourth step we eliminate the existential 
quantifiers through the process of Skolemization. This has been explained in chapter 2. 
Thereafter all universal quantifiers are eliminated. The expression is then put into 
conjunctive normal form, i.e. the disjunction is distributed over the conjunction. This is 
achieved by repeatedly using the rule: AV(B/\C) = (AVB) /\ (AVC). Finally all operators 
are removed by writing the conjunction as a set of clauses, e.g. ({A,B},{A,C} ). If need 
be, variables are renamed so that no variable appear more than once within a clause. Let 
us illustrate the procedure by an example. 
Example 3.2 
Given the sentence Vx :3y[P(x,y) - Vx(Q(x,y)/\R(x,y))], we convert it to clausal form by 
applying the above procedure. 
1. Eliminate implication: Vx :3y [~P(x,y) V Vx(Q(x,y)/\ R(x,y))] 
2. Negation already applies to a single atomic sentence. 
3. Rename variables so that each quantifier has a unique variable: 
Vx :3y [ ~P(x,y) V Vz(Q(z,y)/\ R(z,y))] 
4. Eliminate existential quantifier by introducing Skol em functions since the 
existential quantifier is within the scope of the universal quantifier: 
Vx [~P(x,Fl(x)) V Vz(Q(z,F2(x)/\ R(z,F2(x))] 
5. Eliminate universal quantifiers: ~P(x,Fl(x)) V (Q(z,F2(x)/\ R(z,F2(x)) 
6. Put the expression into conjunctive normal form: 
~P(x,Fl(x)) V Q(z,F2(x)) /\ ~P(x,Fl(x)) V R(z,F2(x)) 
7. Eliminate operators, that is, write the expression obtained in step 6 in clausal form: 
{ ~P(x,Fl(x)), Q(z,F2(x))} 
{ ~P(x,Fl(x)), R(z,F2(x))} 
8. Rename variables so that they do not appear in more than one clause: 
{ ~P(x1'F l(x1)), Q(z,F2(x1))} 
{ ~P(x,,Fl(x:J), R(z,F2(x2))} a 
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Linear Resolution 
Reiter uses the linear resolution strategy to find a default proof of a wff. What is the 
characteristic of a linear resolution proof? A linear resolvent is one in which at least one 
of the parent clauses is either in the initial belief set or an ancestor of the other parent 
[ 12]. A linear deduction is one in which each derived clause is a linear resolvent. 
Graphically, a linear resolution proof of P from some set of clauses S, is given in the fotm 
of figure 3. I (26]. An explanation follows. 
Figure 3.1 
One would again ask, how are we going to choose the D0 so that Wu CONS(D0) f- P (the 
goal wff that needs to be proved)? The resolution strategy chosen is a top down theorem 
prover. Therefore the goal wff p can help to choose a suitable subset D0 of D. Reiter uses 
figure 3. I to illustrate the linear resolution procedure. Ro represents the negation of the 
goal wff p ( ~p) and C0 represents one of the wffs in the initial belief set (W). This 
satisfies the condition of the linear resolution strategy. R1 is the resolvent of Ro and C0 
Next R2 is obtained from R, and Ci, where Ci is in the initial belief set or an ancestor 
of Ri. This procedure continues until R., an empty set or empty clause is obtained, 
showing that Pis provable by the refutation theorem. This theorem states that IfWu{P} 
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is inconsistent, then w~~p, where Wis the original belief set [14]. In this case we 
showed that Wu { ~p } is inconsistent (unsatisfiable) and in the process have demonstrated 
that W logically implies P (W~P). Note that R; are the resolvents and C, are clauses from 
the initial belief set or ancestors of R;, where i = I.. .n. 
Since this resolution principle is extended to Default logic, we need to represent the 
default theory T=<W,D> in clausal form. How do we do that? Firstly we write the wffs 
of W in clausal form according to the procedure above. But we also require that the 
consequents of the defaults from D be represented in clausal form. Take the default 
d=(A:B/B) ED, since B is a wff, it can be written in clausal form with B, , ... ,13,, its 
clauses. When a default d is applied, we conclude its consequent. But the consequent is 
in clausal form and there may be more than one consequent clause B, of the default d. 
Also there may be more than one default in the theory. To indicate from which default 
the consequent clause B, is derived, the consequent clause B, is indexed by that default. 
For example, <B,, {d}>, I:;;i,;; n is called a clausal ordered pair. A pair <C, D>, where C 
is a clause and D is a set of defaults, is referred to as an indexed clause. Now that the 
details of the representation of the default theory T in clausal form have been specified, 
we continue with the discussion of a default proof of a sentence p. 
We shall use the linear resolution theorem prover to determine the sets 0 0, •.. ,Dk. The 
structure of a linear resolution theorem prover for a default theory is represented in figure 
3.2 [26]. 
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(C,, D2) 
Figure 3.2 
We use the principle of refutation to prove the goal clause as we have explained above, 
using figure 3.1. The difference in figure 3.2 is that now the clauses are indexed, since 
we need to keep track of the defaults associated with the resolved clauses. Here again the 
top indexed clause ( R,, , D0 ) is such that Ro is the negation of the clause that we need to 
prove. (R; ,D;) is the resolvent of the indexed clauses (R;.1, D;.1) and (C;.,, D,_1) , for 1 ~ 
i:; n. This process of resolution is repeated until R,, , the empty clause is achieved. In 
general, if(C1, D,) and (C2 , D2) are indexed clauses, and Risa resolvent ofC, and C2 , 
then (R, D1uD2) is an indexed resolvent of the indexed clauses (C,, D,) and (C,, D2). 
Our next task is to show how the sets D11, D1, ••• ,Dk of Definition 3.1 can be determined 
using linear resolution. We shall do that by means of an example. This example uses the 
same theory as Example 3.1. 
Example 3.3 
Let T=<W,D>, where 
W={U=I, UVS} and 
D= { d, = !Y._~-~-~0-~-
I/\S ' 
d 2 =I= S :I =G d3 = S /\ G : U 
----r:=<J----, -----li----, 
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Let us see how we can use linear resolution to prove the goal clause IJ\U. 
Let P= IJ\U. Before applying the linear resolution, the the01y, T=<W, D> must be 
represented in clausal f01m. This yields the following: 
W ={~UV!, UVS} and the consequent clauses are 
<I, { d, }>, <S, { d, }>,<~IVG, { d2 }>, <U, { d3 }>, and <~S, { d4 }>} 
We start with the negation of the goal clause, ~p = ~(IJ\U) = ~rv~u 
We now have D0, which is { d3 }. 
Next we need to determine D1. So we use the prerequisite of the default in D0 as goal 
clause, which is SJ\G. Starting with the goal clause and using the linear resolution 
technique we have: 
We now have D1, which is {d1, d2 }. 
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We continue in the same manner, by using the prerequisite(s) of the previous default(s) 
invoked, as the goal clause. As before we start with the negation of the goal clause. In 
this case it would be the negation of the conjunction of the prerequisites of d1 and d2 , i.e. 
~(IVS fl I-S). The prerequisites are not in clausal form. Converting the expression into 
clausal form yields the following: 
~((IVS)/\ ((~I/\~S)V(If\S))). The negation is taken in to give ~(IVS)V ~((~Jfl~S)V(l/\S)). 
Taking in the negation again gives ~(IVS )V((IVS)A(~IV~S)). Writing this expression in 
conjunctive n01mal form gives us the clauses, ~(IVS)V(IVS) /\ ~(IVS)V(~Iv~S). Now 
~(IVS)V(IVS) gives (~I/\~S)V(IVS), which in tum yields (IVSV~I) /\ (IVSV~S). In a 
similar way ~(IVS)V(~IV~S) yields ~rv~s. The three clauses of the negation of the 
prerequisites of d1 and d2 are (IVSV~I), (IVSV~S) and (~IV~S). 
Getting back to the proof, we now have the following: 
We statt with one of the clauses of the negation of the prerequisites of d1 and d2 
The procedure returns { d1} 
The prerequisite of d1 is IVS and its negation is ~Jfl~S. To complete the proof we 
proceed as before. Again we start with one of the clauses of the prerequisite of d1. 
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~r ~uvr 
~ 
~u uvs 
~ 
S ~S .......... Other clause of the negatwn of the prerequisite. ct,. 
~ 
D 
D, = { } is the last set in the sequence that represents the default proof ofI/\U. 
The default proof is { d3}, { d., di}, { d1}, {}. 
This proof brings us to the following two definitions given in [26]: 
Definition 3.3 
a 
Let T= <W,D> be a closed normal default theory, where Wis a set of ordinary clauses. 
CLAUSES(T) = {<C,{d}>I dE D and <C,{d}> is a consequent clause of d} u {<C,{}>1 
C EW} 
Definition 3.4 
A top-down default proof of P wrt T= <W,D> is a sequence L0, ... ,Lk oflinear resolution 
proofs such that 
1. L0 is a linear resolution proof of P from CLAUSES(T). 
2. For O,;i,;;k, L, returns D,. 
3. For bisk, L, is a linear resolution proof of PRE(D,.1) from CLAUSES(T). 
4. Dk= { }. 
5. Wu D CONS(D;) is consistent. 
i=O 
The fust linear resolution proof of the example above corresponds to L0, which returns 
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D0 of the default proof of !AU CP ). L1 is the linear resolution proof which returns D1, L2 
is the linear resolution proof which returns D2 and finally L3 is the linear resolution proof 
returning D3. The elements of CLAUSES(T) include all the indexed clauses, where each 
clause is indexed by the default which gave rise to it, as well as the ordinary clauses of 
W. 
Some observations can be made with respect to top-down default proofs. At each stage 
of the proof the current goal, i.e. P or PRE(D,.1) guides the selection of the defaults 
necessary for establishing the goal. Also noticeable is the fact that a proof of p can be 
established without invoking any defaults, i.e. using W alone first, and introducing one 
or more consequent clause(s) only if necessary. If the proof involves only W, and no 
defaults then P assumes a firmer status. In such a case P is monotonic, in that p need 
never be retracted under the addition of new first-order facts about the world. 
3.5 Soundness and Completeness of default proofs 
Linear resolution is sound, which means that a set of beliefs entails P if there exists a 
linear resolution proof from the set CLAUSES(T) (the set of beliefs together with ~p ), 
which produces the empty clause. The following theorem states: 
Theorem 3.1 
Let T =<W,D> a closed normal default theory and P a closed wff If P has a default proof 
with respect to T, then P is in some extension E of T. 
A complete proof appears in [27] (theorem 3.11). 
Linear resolution is also complete for first-order logic. This means that there is a linear 
resolution proof of a wff p if the set of beliefs entails p. We find that linear resolution is 
also complete for Default logic. If a set CLAUSES(T) of clauses is unsatisfiable, then 
there is a resolution deduction of the empty clause {}. This is given specifically in 
theorem 3.3. The following theorem from [26] (theorem 4.8) describes the completeness 
property of closed normal default proofs. 
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Theorem 3.2 
Let P be a closed wff. If a consistent closed nonnal default theory T has an extension E 
such that p E E then p has a default proof with respect to T. 
Since a default proof of a wff P is a set of linear resolution proofs, and a linear resolution 
proof is an example of a top-down default proof, we can conclude that linear resolution 
is sound and complete for Default logic. This is given in the following theorem. 
Theorem 3.3 [ 17] 
Let T= <W,D> be a consistent closed nmmal default theory and p a closed wff. Then T 
has an extension containing p iff there is a top-down default proof of p with respect to 
T. 
3.6 Revision of Beliefs 
In chapter 2 it was made clear that generating an extension is actually further completing 
an incomplete knowledge base. This involves invoking defaults that are coherent with one 
another for the patticular world involved. However it is also clear that there may be more 
than one extension of a given theory, since there may be more than one combination of 
coherent defaults. We are at liberty to choose any one of these extensions as our cun-ent 
view of the world. Therefore an agent cannot use just any set of derived beliefs. The 
beliefs must all belong to a common extension. One would want to use derived beliefs 
as lemmas for deriving new beliefs. If we do this we will be generating a subset (an 
approximate extension) of some extension for the original default theory T. This 
procedure indicates that the derived beliefs { p0, I\ , .. ., } must be a subset of some 
extension E for T. However the following example shows that this condition cannot 
always be met. 
Example 3.4 
T0 = \/{A- B }, I :A , B: ~A } ) \ -ir --=-,7,;-
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From the theory T0 we would be able to derive the belief B. This would obviously be p0 , 
the first derived belief. The new theory now becomes 
T1 =( {A-B, B},l:A, B: ~A} ) \ 7\ --::;A-
Using the new derived Bas a lemma, we would be able to derive the belief ~A. This then 
would be the second derived belief p1• But ~A is not in the extension of the original 
theoryT0 (E={A-B,B}). a 
Reiter [26] provides a sufficient condition to use derived beliefs as lemmas. This is given 
by the following theorem. 
Theorem 3.4 
Let T0 = <W,D> be a closed normal default theory. In general, suppose T; has been 
determined and that P~; is a default proof of P; with respect to T; . Let T;-i = 
<Wu{p0, ... ,p;}, D>. For any n;-,0, if Wu-~ CONS(DS(P" )) is consistent then i=O " 
T0 has an extension E0 such that {p0, ••• ,p.} i= E0 . 
However there is still this question: How does an agent proceed if the derived beliefs do 
not satisfy the consistency property? In other words, can previously held beliefs remain 
with the addition of new facts about the world? Similar questions can be asked with 
regard to the addition of defaults. For both the questions posed, Reiter [26] provides 
conditions in the form of theorems 3.5 and 3.6. 
Theorem 3.5 
Let T0 = <W,D> be a closed normal default theory, and let {p0, ... ,p.} be a set of 
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derived beliefs determined as stated in theorem 3.4. Suppose fm1her that f\;;L is a 
set of closed wffs. If Wu Fu u CONS(DS(Pp; )) is consistent then (WuF,D) 
a=O 
has an extension E such that {p0 , ... ,p0 } \;; E. 
Theorem 3.6 
Let To= <W,D> be a closed normal default theory, and let {p0, ... ,p.) be a set of 
derived beliefs determined as stated in theorem 3.4. Suppose further that D1 is a set of 
closed n01mal defaults. If <W,D> has an extension E such that {p0, •.. ,p.} \;; E then 
(DuD,,W) has an extension E1 such that {p0, ... ,P.} \;; E, . 
However it is still possible that the consistency property fails to hold. This is the subject 
of a process known as belief revision. In [8), Doyle uses a truth maintenance system in 
order to perform belief revision. We will not dwell on this process in this disse11ation. 
You may refer to Doyle's paper. 
It has been stated that there may be more than one set of coherent beliefs, hence more 
than one extension can be built. An agent cannot work with all the extensions. Therefore 
one needs to restrict the number of extensions. But how does one do that? One way is to 
rank the defaults in order of priorities in order to decide which ones should be chosen in 
case of conflict. This then brings us to the notion of prioritising the defaults described in 
[ 19). The next section describes a general framework for the representation of such 
priorities, and a mechanism for taking these priorities into account when reasoning by 
default is investigated. 
3. 7 Prioritised conflict resolution 
A number of authors have proposed an ordering ([2], [ 15]) among the defaults such that 
d1 :> d2 means that the default d1 is less reliable than d2• In effect it means that if d1 and 
d2 are in conflict, then d2 should be used to generate an extension rather than d1. In [ 19), 
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Mengin proposes to associate to such an ordering a so-called elimination function - a 
mechanism for eliminating defaults in case of conflict. He uses this elimination function 
to represent priorities among the defaults. The purpose of this function is to eliminate one 
of the minimal elements (those of lowest priority) in order to resolve a conflict. Some 
preliminary definitions need to be given in order to understand the approach used by 
Mengin. In [20], he gives another characteristisation of extensions of a default theory, 
based on the definitions that follow. Mengin uses this characterisation in his approach to 
conflict resolution. 
3.7.1 Preliminaries 
Definition 3.5 
Let <W,D> be a closed default theory. The set of formulas generated by a subset 
U of D, denoted by Thder (WuU), is the smallest set of formulas that contains W, is 
f-g 
deductively closed (in the sense of predicate calculus), and such that for an -·ii EU, 
iff E Thdef (WuU) then hEThdef(WuU). 
Example 3.5 
Let W = {Cricketer( Stanton), ~Healthy(Stanton)} and 
D = { d1 = <;,!i~-~et~Ii~tT~!!(~). dz = Cri~ki:ti:!~lll.<:.!!!!h.J::~) } 
Tall(x) Healthy (x) . 
_ { ~E.!:~~!~1~L!.~~~(~) } 
A subset ofD, U - Tall(x) 
generates the formula Tall(x) after applying d1. Clearly it holds that for all defaults f:g/h 
EU, WuU is consistent. Note that d2 cannot be an element ofU otherwise WuU would 
be inconsistent and definition 3.5 would not hold. a 
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Definition 3.6 (from [20]) 
The conflicts of a default theory <W,D> are subsets C of D minimal (smallest subset) 
such that W uC is inconsistent. We will denote the set of conflicts of the theory by E. 
In other words, a conflict is a subset C ofD that contains at least one default if such that 
fA~g E Th"'r(WuU). The following example illustrates the concepts "conflict" and 
"minimal". 
Example 3.6 
Let W = { Cricketer(Stanton), Jockey(Stanton), Cricketer(Joash)} and 
D = { ~~~~~-:!:~~:XI~-~5~~ ~~-~~:x~:X_=:_!_~~l_(~) I x E {Stanton, Joash} } 
Tall (x) ' ~Tall(x) · 
The conflict of the theory is the subset 
C={Cricketer(Stanton):Tall(Stanton)/Tall(Stanton), Jockey(Stanton): ~Tall(Stanton)/ 
~Tall(Stanton)}. We say that C is minimally inconsistent since C is the only conflict 
of the theory. In other words we could not delete any of the defaults from the set C 
without making WuC consistent. We observe that WuD is inconsistent, however it is 
not minimally inconsistent. If we replaced the default variables with the constant 
Joash then removal of any of the defaults that are unified with Joash would still make 
WuD inconsistent. Therefore WuD is not minimally inconsistent. The defaults about 
Joash are not conflicting, since the prerequisite of the second default cannot be proved 
(Joash is not a jockey). a 
Definition 3. 7 
An elimination jimction on a default theory <W,D> is a function o that associates, to each 
conflict C of the theory a set of pairs of the form (d,V), where dis an element ofC and 
Vis a consistent subset of Wu D. A subset U of Dis 0- preferred if it does not contain 
any conflict of the theory and it verifies: 
\id E D\U, ::JC EE, Ci; Uu { d} and (d,U) E o(C). 
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This means that (d, V) E o(C) which implies that in order to resolve the conflict C, d must 
be eliminated if the wffs in V are tme. In the next section a proof theory for Default logic 
based on the concept of prioritised conflict resolution is given. 
3.7.2 A proof theory for Default logic based on prioritised conflict resolution 
Keeping in mind that there can be any number of extensions of a theo1y, we would like 
to restrict the number of extensions in order to obtain a more 'reliable' world. To do this, 
Mengin [ 19] uses priorities among the defaults. Priorities may be based on the ordering 
of relations among the defaults indicating their reliabilities relative to each other. 
Checking the coherence of a set of defaults is the same as computing the conflicts of the 
default theory. In order to compute the conflicts of a default theory, Mengin extel'l.ds the 
resolution principle to defaults. He does this by defining: 
I. Extended clauses to represent defaults and 
2. New resolution mies. 
Definition 3.8 
The clausal fo1m of a default d = ~c.N~CJ::f (where CN, CN' and CN' are 
CN' ' 
- ' 
conjunctions of clauses), is the set of defaults d = { ~~cd I cECN, c'ECN', 
c 
c' E CN', d is the "index" of the default}. D will denote the union of the clausal forms 
of the set of defaults D, and the elements of D are called the extended clauses. 
Some comments can be made with respect to definition 3.8. A default theory T = <W,D> 
may contain many defaults in the set D. All the prerequisites, justifications and 
consequents of the different defaults are written in clausal form. The conjunctions of 
these clausal prerequisites, justifications and consequents respectively, are of the form 
~ CN:CN'. Therefore the individual defaults ~:c', which are in clausal form, are indexed 
---------,- --,,. CN c 
by d indicating which default the extended clause (default) ~~~;~ d belongs to. 
c 
Let us see how these extended clauses are implemented using the new resolution mies 
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proposed in [19]. The new resolution rules has the following format: 
Clause/Extended clause Extended clause 
Resolvent(Clause/Extended clause) 
We will use Figure 3 .3 to explain the extended resolution rules [ 19]. 
Rule 1 C1 ---ic2 : c' Rule 2 ......,c,:c' -,c2:c' 
------- d ------- d ------- d en ff n c c 
~f~_!: ___ d ~c:c 
----- d ff cff c 
Rule 3 ---,o:c ' Rule 4 ---,a·c' 
------ d ---~- d ff en c 
c' --.o: c' 
------ d 
T 
Rule 5 C1 -.o·c Rule 6 ---,a·c --,o·c 
___ :_L d ---~-L d ---~-?: d 
T T T 
--.o :c 
------ d 
-.o:c 
----- d 
T T 
Figure 3.3 
The consistency of defaults are checked by applying these new resolution rules, together 
with the classical rules, to generate an empty clause. Mengin [ 19] refers to this 
implementation as the extended resolution principle. 
In the above figw·e, c1 and c2 denote two clauses whose resolvent is c. When resolutions 
are made between the prerequisites of the extended clauses, the resolvent is an extended 
clause (default), or a clause as in the classical sense. Similarly, resolutions are made 
between the justifications of extended clauses, which results in an extended clause. 
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Resolutions are also made between the clauses of W and the prerequisite (or justification) 
clauses of a default. In each of the mies above note that the resolvent is an extended 
clause or a consequent clause of the extended clause. 
In mle 1, resolution is made between the clause c1 from Wand the prerequisite clause ~c, 
of the default. In mle 2 resolution is made between the prerequisites of the two defaults. 
Rule 3 means that the prerequisite clause is empty and therefore the consequent clause 
can be used like any wff from W. (In other words the prerequisite clause of d has been 
proved). 
Whenever the extended clause ::.:!~11: d is generated, it means that the prerequisite 
c" 
of this default is proved. To avoid the redundancy of producing the consequent (c') of d 
in mle 3 more than once, the result of mle 3 is rewritten in mle 4. This means that the 
resolvent of mle 3 may be replaced by that of mle 4, provided that the parent clauses are 
the same for both the resolvents. Observe that the parent default is the same for mle 3 and 
4. In mle 5, resolution is made between the clause c1 from W and the justification clause 
c, of d. Rule 6 indicates the resolution between the justifications of the two defaults. 
The clause from Wand the consequent clause, which may be obtained after applying mle 
3, are used to prove the prerequisite clause of a default d, by applying mle l and mle 2. 
Rule 5 and mle 6 are used to check the consistency of the justification by applying 
resolution to it. When an extended clause of the form -::!~:1- d is produced, it means that 
T 
the default is in conflict with the theory. A resolution is made between the prerequisites 
(or the justifications) of two extended clauses if they have been produced from the same 
default. This can be observed in mies 2 and 6 respectively. 
Theorem 3. 7 [ 19] 
Let <W,D> be a default theory, such that Wis a finite set of clauses and D is finite 
and can be written in clausal form. A subset C of D is a conflict of the theory iff 
it is minimal such that the empty clause of the form ;:i- d can be produced from 
Wu C using the extended mies (1) to (6) and the classical resolution mle. 
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Consider the abstract example taken from [ 19]. 
Example 3.7 
Let W={pVq, ~rv~s} and D = { d, d'}, where d = pVq:r and d'= q:t The 
s -r · 
resolutions are shown in the figure below, indicating that { d} is a conflict of the theory. 
pVq ~(~p):r ~(~q):r 
------- d -------- d ~s s --\~'d~ 
~(D):r 
------ d 
~(~q):t , 
------- d t 
s 
~(D):r ------1 
------ d s 
T 
~(D):D 
------ d 
T 
Figure 3.4 
Resolution is made between the wff pVq of Wand the prerequisite of default d 
using rule 1. (The default d is written as two separate defaults namely 
~(~p):r/s and ~(~q):r/s because pVq is equivalent to ~(~A~q) ). The resolvent 
~Cg).:!_ d and the other prerequisite clause ::::C:::.q}:.r d are then resolved to yield 
s s 
~{~).:! d using rule 2 (resolution between the prerequisite clauses). Rule 3 is 
s 
applied to yield the consequent clause s, since the prerequisite clause has been 
proved according to the extended rules. Also from the same resolvent, we have 
according to rule 4 the extended default -:.!_c:~.t!_ d. Nows is resolved with the other 
T 
wff-·:rV~s to yield ~. by applying the classical resolution rule. Using rule 5 and 6 
the justification of the resolvent ~{9};,~ d and ~ is then resolved to yield ~f9t9 d 
T T 
This then proves that {d} is a conflict of the theory. a 
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In [ 19] Mengin proposes a proof theory for Default logic based on the concept of conflict 
resolution. The four steps involved in deciding whether a wff p is in at least one 
extension of the themy <W,D> are: 
1 Compute the conflicts of <W, Du{P:a!a}> 
2 Compute the elimination function o on the conflicts of <W,D>. 
3 Compute the 6-prefetTed subsets of D (extensions of the theoty). 
4 P is in the extension generated by an 6-prefetTed subset U of D iff there is a 
conflict V u{p :a/a} of(W,D u {P :a/a}) such that V(;; U. 
3.8 Conclusion 
For the purposes of this dissertation I will not go into the mathematical detail of 
prioritising the defaults. This can be read in [19]. However, to summarise Mengin's 
approach to prioritised Default logic, he provides together with the extension of the 
resolution principle, a type of deduction theorem that provides a link between the notion 
of conflicting defaults and that of the monotonic deduction with defaults. 
In this chapter a proof theory for Default logic and the notion of prioritized conflict 
resolution which underlies the basic feature of default reasoning was presented. A 
theorem prover for Default logic based on the notion of pri01itised conflict resolution was 
investigated, thereby introducing extended clauses and the new resolution mies for this 
logic. The notion of expectations, which is explained in chapter 5 is closely linked to 
prioritised conflict resolution. We will see how this notion of expectations may be 
modelled by neural networks, the subject of chapter 5. But first we need some 
preliminary background to neural networks in general - the topic of the next chapter. 
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4 ARTIF!CIAL NEURAL NETWORKS 
4.1 Introduction 
Artificial neural nets are basically mathematical models of information processing. They 
are modelled by the architecture of the biological neural network- the brain. The secret 
of the high performance of the human brain is in its massively parallel function and not 
in the capability of one (unit) neuron. A neural net consists of a large number of 
processing elements called neurons or units (sometimes called cells or nodes). Neurons 
can receive input from and send input to other neurons. Each neuron is connected to other 
neurons by means of directed links with an associated weight. These weights represent 
information being used by the net to solve a problem. Each neuron has an internal state, 
called its activation or activity level. This activity level is a function of the inputs it 
receives, and its result is sent as a signal through connections to several other neurons. 
A neuron can send only one signal at a time, although that signal can be sent to several 
other neurons. A neuron adjusts its own activity level by summing individual incoming 
signals scaled down by the weight of the incoming connection. This process is defined 
by an activation fonction. Activation functions vary from one neural network model to 
another. Often a sigmoid function is used to make the activity level fall in the range from 
0 to 1. This activity level is in fact the output of the neuron. Generally the output will be 
a discrete value, 0 or 1. The output is 0 until the activity level crosses some threshold 
value when it changes to 1. Positively weighted connections are said to be excitatory, and 
negatively weighted connections are said to be inhibitory [6]. In order to understand the 
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workings of an artificial neural net (ANN), one can compare it to the biological neural 
network. The following diagram is taken from [10]. 
Axon from another 
~n 
Simapti~ 
gap 
Axon from 
another neuron 
Figure 4.1 
Dendrite 
soma 
Axon 
Dendrite of 
Another neuron 
I 
I 
Dendrite of 
Another neuron 
Figure 4.1 illustrates a biological neuron, together with axons from two other neurons and 
dendrites connected to two other neurons. The axons and dendrites are the connections 
that carry the signals from one neuron to another. The axons allow a neuron to send a 
signal to other neurons, whereas the dendrites are the connections that allow the neuron 
to receive the signal from other neurons. The soma or cell body takes cognisance of 
(sums) the incoming signals from the dendrites. The synaptic gap is the region where one 
cell excites or inihibits another cell. When sufficient input (synapse strength) is received, 
(i.e. when some threshold value is reached) the cell is activated, which means that the cell 
fires. In other words, it transmits a signal over its axon to other cells. Also important is 
the fact that neurons have failures (die) without negative impact on performance. It is also 
possible for us to recognize a person in a picture we have seen before or to recognize 
someone after a long period of time. This characteristic indicates that biological neural 
networks are fault tolerant. The key features of an ANN, suggested by the properties of 
the biological neuron can now be summarised: 
•The processing element (node) receives many signals. 
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• Signals may be changed by a weight, similar to that of the action of the chemical 
process at the receiving synaptic gap (weight is the value associated with a 
connection path between two processing elements in a neural network). 
• The processing element sums the weighted inputs. 
• After receiving sufficient input, the neuron transmits a single output. 
• The output from a particular neuron may go to many other neurons. 
• A weight (synapse strength) may be modified by experience. 
• It is fault tolerant, i.e. an ANN can be trained not to take into account small changes 
to the network, and can be retrained in cases of a lot of damage, e.g. loss of data and 
some connections [10]. 
To distinguish ANNs from other approaches to information processing, we need to see 
how and when ANNs are used. 
4.2 How neural networks are used? 
There are a number of different types of neural networks. A network is characterized by 
the following features: 
• its pattern of connections between the neurons, 
• its method of determining the weights on the connections • this is called its training or 
learning algorithm, and 
• its activation function. 
4.2.1 Architecture of an ANN 
It is helpful to visualize neurons as arranged in layers. Neurons in the same layer behave 
in the same manner. Neurons within one layer typically have the same activation 
function and the same pattern of connections to other neurons in that layer. The neurons 
within a layer are either fully interconnected or not interconnected at all. If there are more 
than one layer, then neurons from one layer are connected to neurons in the next layer. 
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This arrangement of neurons and its pattern of connections are referred to as the net's 
architecture. Neural nets are generally classified into single layer nets and multilayer nets. 
When determining the number of layers the input layer is not counted, since it performs 
no computation in most neural network types. The following figures, taken from [10], 
illustrate a single layer net and a multilayer net respectively. 
Figure 4.2 
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An example of when a single layer net is used is when pattern classification is performed, 
i.e. when classification of vectors (ordered sets of numbers, an n-tuple) in a single 
category is considered. An input pattern is an example of a vector. 
Figure 4.3 
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Multilayer nets have been used for speech recognition. 
The architecture of an associative memory neural net may be feedforward or recurrent 
(iterative). In feedforward neural nets information flows from the input units to the output 
units (possibly via intermediate hidden layers of units). Feedforward nets such as the 
backpropagation net have no connections back to previous layers. In contrast, recurrent 
(iterative) nets such as the Hopfield net have feedback connections (connections among 
the units form closed loops). 
4.2.2 Training or Learning Algorithm 
How do we go about setting the weights on the connections in the net once the 
architecture is decided upon? The setting and adjusting of the weights is part of the 
training algorithm required for the net. Learning is synonomous to training in a net and 
basically involves adjusting weights (synaptic connections) among neurons in such a way 
that the network acquires the desired behaviour. After training the neural net then 
produces a representative vector of the output, which is represented on the output nodes. 
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Three types of training are distinguished, namely supervised, unsupervised and self-
supervised training. In deciding on the type of training, one needs to look at the type of 
problem that must be solved. There is a close correlation between the type of training and 
the kind of problem. 
Supervised training is achieved by presenting a sequence of training patterns or vectors 
with its associated expected output vectors. The weights are then gradually adjusted 
according to the learning algorithm, so that the network responds to given inputs with the 
desired outputs. This type of training is suitable for pattern classification. For example 
consider the logic AND function: 
The input vectors are x 1 . x 2 
I l 
l 0 
0 1 
0 0 
The target outputs are 1, 0, 0, 0 respectively. In this case there would be two nodes in the 
input layer and one node in the output layer. After the net has learnt to map the inputs 
into the desired outputs, the ANN should be able to classify any pair of input vectors 
correctly. 
Unsupervised training is achieved by presenting a sequence of input vectors without 
associated expected output vectors. The neural net groups similar input vectors together. 
It modifies the weights so that the most similar vectors are assigned to the same output 
unit (sometimes referred to as cluster unit) [10]. In other words the network simply plays 
with input data and tries to discover regularities and relationships between the different 
parts of the input. 
The third type of training method - self-supervised training - can solve constrained 
optimization problems, that is, problems with conflicting constraints. In other words not 
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all constraints can be satisfied simultaneously. An example of a typical optimization 
problem is: Given the building of a hospital, what is the best way to lay the wiring for the 
conduction of electricity for all components requiring electricity? When these nets are 
designed the weights are set to represent the constraints and the quantity to be maximized 
or minimized. In trying to quantify the criterion "best" solution in an optimisation 
problem, a mathematical function (called an energy function) which must be minimised 
is used. In these cases a nearly optimal solution, which the net can find, is often 
satisfactory. 
4.2.3 Activation function 
As stated earlier, the function of an artificial neuron involves summing its weighted input 
signals. This summation value then goes through a thresholding function, called an 
activation function. This function decides the node value for the node, i.e. it decides 
whether the node should be activated or not. In most cases a nonlinear activation function 
is used. To maintain the advantages achieved when using multilayer nets, as opposed to 
single layer nets, it is necessary to use nonlinear activation functions. Some of these 
advantages gained are efficiency, faster computations and the ability to handle more 
complex problems. 
Some common activation functions are: 
(1) Identity function: f(x) = x , this function is for the input units, generally no 
computation is performed. 
(2) Binary Step function: f(x) = {J if x ;, a , where a is a fixed threshold value. 
ifx< a 
(3) Sigmoid function (S-shaped curves), which is continuous and seems more 
appropriate for nonmonotonic reasoning, since beliefs derived maybe fuzzy. 
Often a sigmoid function (with range [O, 1]) is used as the activation function 
for neural nets. In these nets the desired output values may be either binary or in the 
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interval [O, I]. For this reason the activation function is called binary sigmoid. 
The binary sigmoid function is defined as f(x) = I 
r-+-expf-cri') , 
where a is the steepness parameter. 
4.3 The energy function 
An energy function is a function of the weights and activations of a neural network. It is 
monotone nonincreasing and bounded from below. A network is said to reach equilibrium 
(a stable state) when the energy function settles on a local or global minimum. Each node 
computes the gradient of the function and modifies its activation value so that the energy 
decreases gradually. In [13] it has been shown that optimisation problems can be 
formulated as constraints which are expressed in quadratic energy functions. These 
functions are minimised using symmetric networks, such as the Hopfield network 
(described in section 4.4.2 below). 
4.4 Models of neural nets 
There are many models of neural nets based on their architecture and the learning 
algorithm. We will briefly discuss two models of neural nets and investigate one with 
with the view of simulating default reasoning. 
4.4.1 Backpropagation neural net 
Backpropagation takes input vectors and broadcasts them to the hidden units in the next 
layer, which in turn takes the activations obtained in each unit and broadcasts it to the 
next layer until it reaches the output layer. The computed (actual) output is then 
compared to the target output and this difference (associated error) is propagated back 
into the net in the reverse direction. Weights are adjusted during this phase. This process 
is iterated a number of times until some condition is satisfied. The training of the 
backpropagation net involves three stages: the feedforward of the input training pattern, 
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the backpropagation of the error, and the adjustment of the weights. This type of net 
implements a learning algorithm for multilayer neural nets based on minimising the mean, 
or total squared error (the square of the difference between the target and the actual 
output is summed over all output units and over all training patterns). 
4.4.2 The Hopfield network 
The Hopfield net is a single large layer of neurons; every neuron connects to every 
other neuron. The Hopfield network is a memory model with the following features: 
• distributed representation (i.e. not one memory location, but a collection of 
processing elements) 
• distributed control (each processing element makes decisions based on its own local 
situation) 
•content addressable memory (a network can store a number of patterns; to retrieve· 
one, we need only specify a part of it) 
• fault tolerance (if a few processing elements misbehave or fail, the network will still 
function correctly). 
The Hopfield network processes binary vectors, i.e. vectors with O's and l's. However, 
one can convert the binary vector to an equivalent bipolar vector as 
follows: 1 \ I _, • I J v= I 2v-l 1 ' 
0 ..... -I 
0 -1 
I 1 
1 1 
In 2v-l, 1 denotes a vector with all components equal to 1. The weight matrix (a 
combination of the vectors of weights) is calculated as follows: 
W = t (2vk·l)(2vk-l)r, where Lis the number of vectors of weights and T denotes 
ko} 
the transpose of a vector (rows become columns and vice versa). The net 
has symmetric weights with no self-connections, i.e. w,i = wii and w1; = 0, for i = 
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1, .. , n andj = 1, ... , n. Therefore the matrix is symmetric. The sum of the inputs into each 
processing element X; is 
n 
net, = L wij X; , i = 1, 2, ... , n, n is the number of processing elements; w,i is the 
1=1 
weight from unit x, to unit X;. The sum of the inputs may be written in vector form as 
net=W.X. 
4.4.2.1 The training algorithm in a Hopfield network 
To store a set of patterns and their associated output, Fauset [10] implements a rule called 
the Hebb rule. This rule can be described by the following algoritlun; 
Step 1 Initialize all weights (i = 1, ... , n; j = 1, ... , n); 
Step 2 For each input training and target output pair (s:t), do steps 3 to 5. 
Step 3 Set activations for input units to current training input (i = 1, ... , n): 
X; :=Si 
Step 4 Set activations for output units to current target output (j = 1, ... , n): 
Yi :=ti 
Step 5 Adjust the weights (i = 1, ... , n; j = 1, ... , n): 
wii (new)= wii (old)+ X; Yi . 
After the training vectors have been stored in the net, the training begins by implementing 
the so-called relaxation algorithm and the steady state test. 
Relaxation algorithm 
Repeat 
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l Choose a random unit x, (units need not be chosen sequentially, however all 
units must be updated) 
n 
2 Calculate net, = L WiJ Xi....... wx is the coefiicient of the temi in the energy function. 
j"' I 
3 If net, > 0 then X; = 1 Affects the energy function as the x values change. 
Else if net, < 0 then x, = 0 
Else if net, = 0 then x, = x, 
4 Ifx, changes then change :=true 
Until (all units have been updated); 
Steady state test 
Store the input patterns 
Enter an input vector 
change :=false; 
Repeat 
For (each input vector) do 
Begin 
I Run the relaxation algorithm 
2 If change = true then 
steady state :=change (Test for convergence) 
End 
Until steady _state is achieved (i.e. no change in the nodes are detected in several 
consecutive runs); 
The energy function, E(x) = -XT WX = -XT.net 
= -[Xi. x2, .•• , x. ] net1 
net2 
net. 
n 
= -( L x,net; + X; neti) 
i=l 
i·1j 
The relaxation process changes an "incorrect'' value of X; to the correct one. For 
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example, ifxj =l but should be 0, it means that net;< 0 and, therefore (xj netj )01d<O. 
Relaxation changes xj to 0, and therefore (xj neti)new = 0. The energy function E(x) is 
decreased. In a similar way, ifx; = 0 but should be I, it means that net; >O. The energy 
function decreases during each step of the relaxation process. 
It has been shown in [ 14] that a large group oflogical problems involving real world 
situations can be strnctured as optimization problems. Hence, a search for the best 
solution is required. In order to quantify the vague criterion, "best", a mathematical 
function (energy function) to be minimised is used. 
4.4.2.2 Travelling Salesman Problem (an example) 
In [14], Hopfield and Tank draw a parallel between the computational powers used 
by the nervous systems and the highly interconnected networks of nonlinear analog 
neurons. The problems to be solved must therefore be formulated in terms of the 
desired optima, which are often subject to constraints. The classic Travelling 
Salesman Problem (TSP) is an example of an optimisation problem. The Hopfield 
network has been used to find the "best" solution. Briefly, a set of n cities C1 , C2 , ..• , 
C. have distances between pairs of cities. The problem is to find a closed tour which 
visits each city once, returns to the stai1ing city, and has a minimum total path length. 
As the number of cities increase the time taken to solve the problem grows 
exponentially. The solution to the TSP, and many optimisation problems is a discrete 
answer [14]. For the representation of knowledge in a network strncture each unit is 
associated with some meaningful concept and it is proposed in [22] that a "compiler" 
(program) translate the symbolic representation into a network structure. 
This example will be discussed in detail in order to explain the working of a Hop field 
network. 
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Example 4.1 TSP Problem [14] 
In order to solve the TSP problem the following constraints must be satisfied: 
• each city is visited only once 
• only one city is visted at a time 
• the total jowney is minimised 
We may visualize an example of this problem graphically as follows: 
22 
An example of a (non-minimal) path is 
A---B---C-D--E-A 
14 + 8 + 11+15 + 22 = 48 +22 
A better solution is 
A-D---E---B--C--A 
6+15+12 + 8+15= 41 +15 
15 
The nodes represent cities and the labels the distances between the cities. In this example 
there are 5! = 120 routes. How do we describe this problem in terms of a Hopfield 
network? Let 5 be the number of cities. We will form 5-tuples for each city; for example 
the 5-tuple for city A is (0, 0, 1, 0, 0) where 1 on the third position means that the city A 
was visited as the third one. All 5-tuples for five cities will be as follows: 
STOP NUMBER 
City I 2 3 4 
A 0 I 0 0 
B 0 0 0 0 
c I 0 0 0 
D 0 0 0 I 
E 0 0 I 0 
Figure 4.4 
5 
0 
I 
0 
0 
0 
tuple I 
tuple 2 
tuple 3 
tuple 4 
tuple 5 
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This represents the following path between the cities. 
C----A----E----D----B----C. 
Each cell in the above set of tuples will be represented by one neuron, i.e. the Hopfield 
layer will have 5 nodes in each tuple, yielding a layer of 25 nodes. Graphically the layer 
will have a structure as shown below: 
I tuple I I tuple 2 I tuple 3 I tuple 4 I tuple 5 
The following notation is used: 
Vx., : output of the neuron corresponding to city x and stop i (xth row , ith column) 
~.y: distance between cities x and y. 
The network must be described by an energy function in which the lowest energy state 
(stable state) corresponds to the best path. Basically the energy function must satisfy the 
following demands: 
1. Each city will be visited only once (each row contains only one 1). 
2. Only one city is visited at a time (each column contains only one I). 
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3. All cities must be visited (the table must contain n l's. In this example there will 
be five l's). 
4. The total distance must be the shottest possible. 
The first three demands, shown in the form of a petmutation matrix which favours stable 
states, are shown in figure 4.4. Of all the valid tours (5! tours) the energy function must 
also favour those tours representing short paths. 
In earlier work Hopfield [13] showed that the equations of motion for a network with 
symmetric connections always lead to a convergence to stable states. In [ 14 ], Hopfield 
proposed that dedicated networks of microelectronic neurons could provide the 
computational capabilities described for a class of problems having combinatorial 
complexity. He drew a parallel to biological neurons by formulating problems to be 
solved by an analog computational network. This formulation required the inclusion of 
seemingly discrete problems in a continuous decision space, in which the neural 
computation operates. He demonstrates how a continuous decision space and continuous 
computation can be related to a discrete computation and why a continuous space can 
improve the solutions obtained by highly-interconnected neural networks. A detailed 
description of an analog computational network is given in [14]. Here it is shown that the 
stable states of the analog network consisting of N neurons are the local minima of the 
energy function. The decision space over which the energy function is minimised is the 
-
interior of the N-dimensional hypercube defined by V,.; = O or I. The comers (stable 
states) of this space correspond to the discrete space consisting of the ZN comers of this 
hypercube. To summarise, Hopfield showed how "neural" computation of decisions can 
be obtained in optimisation problems. 
The TSP network must be described by an energy function in which the lowest energy 
state, i.e. the most stable state of the network, corresponds to the best path. The first three 
demands that the energy function must satisfy can be described by local minima of the 
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energy function. 
nnn nnn nn 
E =A I I Iv,_, vx,j +BI I I vx.i vx.j+ C(I I Vx.; -n)2 
x=I i"'l j-"l i=I X""l y=l x==I i"'l 
where A, 8, and C are positive. 
The fourth demand that the energy function must also satisfy, that which represents 
short paths, can be met by adding a term that contains information about the length 
of a given tour (path). This term is in the form: 
n n n 
DI I I ~y Yx,;(v, .•• 1 + vr.•-1) 
X"'l }=I i=l Y"X 
Hence the total energy function is: 
We must now construct a weight matrix that corresponds to the above energy function. 
It is easier to specify what the net should not do than what it should do. Therefore the 
weight matrix will be defined in terms of inhibitions between neurons. We will index 
weight by using four indices; Wx.i.rJ (connection between neurons x,i and y,j). 
I J 
x 
y 
Figure 4.5 
We use the energy function and a special function a;J to determine the weight matrix. a 
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is defined as a,j = l if i=j and 0 otherwise. 
We look at how each term of the energy function is used: 
Term I: If one unit in a row fires, it should inhibit other units. It is a kind of a winner-
take-all situation. Let us set W x.i.yj = -A ax.y ( 1-a;,> . x=y on one row, means that a .. , = 0. 
If i "j, this will be equal to -A; the neuron at position i will inhibit others but not itself. 
Term 2: If one unit in a column fires, it should inhibit other units in that column in a 
similar manner as explained above. W x.;.yj = -B d;j ( 1-dx.y) 
Term 3: This involves all neurons, so it has a global character. This term is zero if and 
only if there are n entries of l in the entire matrix.We use a global inhibition inhibiting 
each unit equally: W x.;.yj = - C 
Term 4: The selection of adjacent cities is inhibited in proportion to their distance. Thus 
the weight W x.;.yj = -D <l..y(aj.;+1 +aj,;.1) 
\ I 
Adjacent columns to Column j 
All the above inhibitions will be put together for each weight: 
for x = 1,. . ., n; y=l,. . .,n; i=l,. .. ,n; j=l,. . .,n 
wx.i.y.j = -Aa .. y(l-a;) 
-Ba .(1-a ) I, J x,y 
-C 
-D cl.. y (aj. ;-1 +aj,i-1) 
(a;i=l ifi=jand 0 otherwise) 
We view the above scenario in the diagram that follows. 
City 1 
A 0 
STOP NUMBER 
4 5 
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W A.2.E.2 = -B-C 
=--om""'" 
B 0 ;;i~~ll WB,3)3,S = -A-C 
c 0 0 0 0 
D 0 0 0 It~ 0 W0 ,4,E,s = -C-Dd0 .E 
E 0 ~~i~I 1 0 i~~~~~ 
Figure 4.6 
The tenns with A, B, and C coefficients are the general constraints required for any TSP 
problem. This energy function guides the dynamics of the circuit. The "data term" with 
coefficient D controls which one of n! sets of constrained final states is actually chosen 
as the best route. The relaxation algorithm and steady state test is implemented, using the 
computer. In [14] the simulation results of the TSP problem is given. These results 
indicate that the coefficients must be set appropriately and in this case it was found that 
these coefficients were set as follows: 
A=B=500, C=200, D=500. a 
4.5 Default logic and Hopfield NetWorks 
It has been shown in [14] that optimisation problems can be solved satisfactorily using 
the Hop:field neural network. We have said in chapter 3 that default knowledge (default 
rules) can interact with each other and may cause conflicts'. Therefore the problem of 
making a decision or finding the best possible route, taking into account the pieces of 
knowledge and the default rules present, can be seen as an optimisation problem. In other 
words the constraints of the problem must be satisfied simultaneously. Narazaki and 
Ralescu [21] has shown that default knowledge can be represented in a neural network. 
Their work has been motivated by the Hopfield network. Basically knowledge such as 
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that contained in IF-THEN rules (logical implication) are translated into constraints. This 
will be discussed in chapter 5. Because of the uncertainty of the pieces of default 
knowledge and the macroscopic (where the whole knowledge base is considered) nature 
of the knowledge, the continuous Hopfield network is used instead of the discrete 
Hopfield network. Sometimes conclusions are drawn that are considered fuzzy, therefore 
a continuous network would be more suitable. 
4.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter the basic architecture and training algorithm of neural networks have been 
presented. A parallel between the human brain and the neural network has been shown. 
A well defined optimisation problem namely the Travelling Salesman Problem (TSP) has 
been presented. The simulated results of the TSP given in [14] indicate that the Hopfield 
network is an appropriate network to model optimisation problems. This network exploits 
parallelism and is considered to be a promising route to effectively emulate the human 
brain. We will pursue this in chapter 5. 
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5 NONMONOTONIC INFERENCE IN NEURAL NETWORKS 
5.1 Introduction 
Classically an agent's knowledge is represented as a collection ofwell-fonned fonnulas. 
Most AI reasoning systems are based on this logicist view. That is, logic fonnulas and 
a fonnal proof theory are used to reason about beliefs and infer new knowledge. The 
advantage of this approach is its ability to fit all predicates, propositions and or axioms 
into a neat framework of symbolic representation. Classical logic systems are, however, 
inadequate for modeling commonsense reasoning, therefore default reasoning cannot be 
adequately catered for in classical logic. This was discussed in chapters 2 and 3. 
This chapter investigates default reasoning using neural networks. Because of its 
architecture of connections, using neural networks is generally referred to as the 
connectionists approach. This approach concentrates on powerful learning and adaptation 
mechanisms, as opposed to research that concentrates on the development of powerful 
knowledge representation systems. A number of researchers have worked in this field, 
however, the limited scope of this dissertation does not justify covering all the related 
research. Our discussion is to a large extent borrowed from Narazaki and Ralescu [21], 
[22] and Pinkas [23]. 
5.2 Using expectations in default reasoning 
In providing a proof for a wff p in nonmonotonic logic, the infonnation used in the 
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inference consist not only of what we firmly believe, i.e. the current belief set, but also 
information about what we expect in a given situation. However, an inference procedure 
for a wff Pin classical logic depends entirely on the current belief set. For example, if we 
know that it is a hot day, we expect the day to be sunny. Therefore this expectation is not 
a full belief but rather defeasible. This means that if it is hot we may go outside to find 
that it is overcast. So our default assumption that it is sunny should be retracted. 
Formally, if the premise a is in conflict with some of the expectations, then these 
expectations are not used when detennining whether a wff p follows from a. 
Expectations are treated as full beliefs for the purpose of making inferences. Since 
expectations have different strengths, these expectations or beliefs will not be applicable 
all the time. Expectations can be viewed as the result of learning processes. We could 
therefore say that expectations are a way of summarising previous experience in a 
cognitive way [11]. Gardenfors [11] summarises the idea of expectations in relation to 
nonrnonotonic inference: "a nonrnonotonically entails P iff P follows logically from a 
together with as many as possible of the set of our expectations as are compatible with 
a". The following example illustrates the concept of "as many as possible of the set ... ". 
Example 5.1 
Assume the following predicates and the axioms (expectations) associated with them: 
Healthy(x) 
Retired(x) 
Works(x) 
Expectations: Healthy(x) - Works(x) and 
Retired(x) - ~Works(x) and 
~(Healthy(x) /\ Retired(x)) 
From the set of axioms we can conclude that if all we know about a person is that he is 
healthy, then we expect that person to work; and if all we know about another person is 
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that he is retired, we expect him not to work. Now if we learn that Peter is healthy and 
retired, i.e. (Healthy(Peter) /\ Retired(Peter)), what can we conclude regarding his work? 
This information is inconsistent with the set of expectations. If we therefore follow 
Gardenfors' s definition of expectation in relation to inference, we should look for a 
subset of these expectations that contains as many elements as possible which are 
consistent with Healthy(Peter) /\ Retired(Peter). 
To show that these expectations are defeasible, Giirdenfors advocates three possible 
choices. 
l. Retain Healthy(x)-Works(x) and give up Retired(x) - ~Works(x). This would mean 
that Healthy(x) /\ Retired(x) 1-Works(x), where 1- denotes "nonmonotonically entails". 
2. Retain Retired(x) - ~Works(x) and give up Healthy(x) - Works(x). This would mean 
that Healthy(x) /\ Retired(x) I- ~Works(x). 
3. Give up both Healthy(x)-Works(x) and Retired(x) - ~Works(x). In this case we cannot 
conclude anything concrete about x. a 
The example indicates that there is no unique solution. However, a choice has to be made 
and this choice cannot be made by logical considerations alone. We can decide that the 
belief of the second expectation that retired persons do not work is stronger than the 
expectation that healthy people work. (By implication retired people would have already 
worked formally and once retired they will not work again). Healthy people do not 
necessarily work. (For example, children or mothers at home). In this case one would opt 
for the second option. 
The discussion above indicates how nonmonotonic inferences may be interpreted in terms 
of underlying expectations. The approach Mengin follows in [ 19) to resolve conflict is 
based on prioritised conflict resolution and this ties in with the notion of expectations. 
Just as an ordering is defined among the defaults, an ordering is defined among the 
expectations. The expectations are in fact the defaults of the belief set. Therefore the 
expectations listed in example 5.1 can be written in Default logic format as follows: 
Healthy(x): Works(x)/ Works(x) 
Retired(x) : ~works(x)/~Works(x) 
Healthy(x) : ~Retired(x)/~Retired(x) 
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We now need to show how the priotitized defaults can be modelled by neural networks. 
In (28] Shastri shows that the concept of expectation can be interpreted in tenns of 
reasoning in neural networks. Since we have shown the equivalence between expectations 
and defaults it is therefore natural to conclude that defaults can be modelled in neural 
networks. This is the topic of the sections that follow. 
5.3 Nonmonotonic inferences in a neural network 
A major difference between the connectionist approach and symbolic knowledge 
representation approach is that symbolic systems need an interpreter (theorem prover) to 
process the information represented and to reason with it, whilst connectionist networks 
do not have such an interpreter. In the latter, the interpreter and the control mechanism 
are included in the knowledge that is being represented. 
In order to use a neural network to simulate nonmonotonic inference, it must be capable 
of capturing human intuitions such as that found in default reasoning, and must therefore 
have the ability to learn, incorporate new knowledge, and dynamically change the 
knowledge base. 
In [23] Pinkas extends propositional calculus so that it can accommodate the 
characteristics of nonmonotonic reasoning. We show how the notion of expectations can 
be represented using this extended propositional calculus. Pinkas refers to this calculus 
as pena/ity fogic1• A positive real number is assigned to every belief. This number, called 
'Our discussion of penalty logic is to a large extent borrowed from Pinkas [23]. 
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a penalty, may be interpreted as a priority of a belief. This logic can cope with 
inconsistency in the knowledge base as well. It will be shown that eve1y formula in this 
extended logic can be compiled into a symmetric network. 
5.3.1 Penalty logic 
Before an example is presented, we look at the fo1mal definition of penalty logic 
Definition 5.1 
A Penalty Logic wff (PLOFF) cp is a finite set of pairs. Each pair comprises a real 
positive number, called the penalty, and a propositional wff, called the belief, i.e. 
cp = {<p;, <Ii> I P;ER, <Ii is a wff, i=l...n}. 
The following example, adapted from [23] explains the use of penalties. 
Example 5.3 
Penalty :MI 
1000 H 
1000 R 
10 R - ~w 
10 H-W 
3000 Tom 
Is Healthy 
ls Retired 
Retired persons tend not to work. 
Healthy people tend to work. 
Tom is the person we reason about. 
Graphically the above scenario may be represented as shown below. 
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Figure 5.1 
The nodes represent the concepts (atomic propositions) work, healthy, retired, and the 
person we reason about. The links with the arrows between the nodes would represent the 
proposition. In other words the graph is an inheritance network. The penalties reflect how 
strong the beliefs are. The higher the penalty, the higher the priority. The concept of 
priority corresponds to the concept of defeasibility of the beliefs. Higher penalties are 
assigned to facts, while lower penillties are assigned to defeasible rules such as, "Retired 
people tend not to work". When we know that somebody is retired, by default we 
conclude that the person does not work. However, this default assumption can be blocked 
if we have an exception to the rule. The last fact, T, indicates that Tom is the person we 
reason about. It is assigned the highest penalty. In this context, Tom would represent 
evidence, and it is considered a temporary (Tom may die or we may reason about 
someone else) but certain fact. Therefore evidence is not usually part of the knowledge 
base [23]. 
We can infer that Tom is both retired and healthy, but what can we deduce regarding his 
working situation? There is.actually no sufficient evidence to believe either W or ~W; in 
this case W is considered flexible (indecisive). Going back to the ordering of the 
expectations, in the example, it is more natural to assign a higher penalty to the fact that 
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retired persons do not work than to the fact that healthy people work. The knowledge 
base is modified as follows: 
1000 H 
1000 R 
15 R- ~ W 
10 H- W 
3000 Tom 
There are two competing arguments: one supports the assumption that retired people tend 
not to work and the other supp011s the assumption that healthy people work Now that the 
penalty has been adjusted, the first argument wins. 
5.3.2 A general interpretation of the use of penalties 
A knowledge base of assumptions and penalties, <p={ <p., ell>}, determines a ranking over 
the set of all possible models for the set of wffs we're working with. (A model of a set 
ofwffs is a truth assignment, i.e. a function from the set ofwffs to {T,F}, in which all the 
wffs are always true.) This ranking reflects the order of typicality we associate with the 
possible models of this world (some models are more acceptable than others). 
Specifying <p intuitively implies that models that satisfy many "more acceptable" 
assumptions are more appropriate than models that satisfy fewer or "less acceptable" 
assumptions. Two models may be compared by considering the assumptions in <p that are 
contradictoty. A model is considered "more acceptable" than another model ifthe sum 
of the penalties of the contradicting assumptions of the first is less than that of the second. 
The penalties induce a ranking function that assigns a real value to each of the possible 
models. This ranking function is called the violation rank of <p. The violation rank of a 
PLO FF <p is the function Vrank<p that assigns a real-valued rank to each of the tmth 
assignments in <p. The violation rank for a truth assignment x is computed by summing 
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the penalities for the assumptions of q> that are violated by the assignment. In 
mathematical terms this means that 
Vrankcp (x) =LP; H~<1>.Cx) =[ p., where His the characteristic function of the sub-
i X· lfli 
fonnula <Ii,. If x does not satisfy <Ii, then x satisfies ~<Ii,. In this case H-<1>i (x) = 1. 
lfx satisfies <Ii, then H_"';(x) = 0. 
A preferred model (a more plausible model) is therefore a model that minimises the 
Vrankcp function. A PLOFF q> semantically entails <Ii, i.e. cp .. <P iff all the prefened 
models of q> satisfy <Ii. 
Example 5.3 (continued) 
There are only two models: (TRH~W) and (TRHW). In the model (TRH~W) T, R, and 
H are true and W is false. In the model (TRHW) T, R, H and W are true. Both these 
models are prefe1Ted models, since their violation ranks both have the minimal value 10. 
There are some valid conclusions as well, namely (T, H/\R). These conclusions are 
satisfied by both the prefened models. But we observe that W holds in one prefened 
model while ~w holds in the other. a 
In [23] Pinkas developed a sound and complete proof theory for penalty logic. He ranked 
consistent subsets of the assumptions of q>, and used the prefened or rather 'best' 
consistent subset to perform inference. A deduction is made in this proof theo1y iff all the 
preferred consistent subsets entail it. A subset T of the assumptions in q> is called a 
theory of a PLOFF q> iffT is consistent (not contradictory). The penalty of a theo1y T of 
q> is the sum of the penalties of the assumptions in q> that are not included in T, i.e. q>-T. 
The penalty function of q> is defined as Penalty "'(T) = ~~, e (Vq>-TJ Pi. The following more 
formal definition of prefened theories is given in [23]. 
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Definition 5.2 
A prefetTed theory of <p is a themy T that minimizes the Penalty function of <p; that is, 
Penalty<p (T)= min { Penalty<p(S) IS is a themy of <p}. 
Example 5.3 (continued) 
The set of assumptions (H, R, T, W, ~W) leads to a contradiction. But there are 24 (only 
4 propositions, which can take on only one of two values) non-empty consistent subsets 
of ell, where at least one belief of <pis missing. Some of the subsets are {T}, {T- H}, {T-
R}, {H - W}, {T, T-H}, { H - W} (Applying the above discussion, we have the 
preferred theories, T 1 = { (3000, T), ( 1000, T - H), ( 1000, T- R), ( 10, H - W)} and T, = 
{(3000,T), (1000, T- H), (1000,T-R), (10, R- ~W)}. To rank the consistent subset Tl, 
we sum the penalties of the missing beliefs of <p. In this case only one belief is missing, 
namely R-~w which has a strength of 10, hence the prefetTed themy Tl is ranked 10. 
In a similar way it can be shown that the prefetTed theory T2 also has a rank of 10. 
Intuitively we understand the reasoning process to be a competition among the consistent 
subsets. The subsets that win will obviously be the theories with minimal penalty. D 
Now we tum to the representation of penalty logic in connectionist networks, in particular 
symmetric connectionist networks. 
5.3.3 Representing penalty logic in a neural network 
Pinkas [23] describes a PLOFF <p in terms of an energy function as follows: 
Definition 5.3 
A PLOFF <pis strongly equivalent to an energy function (E) (a function that is bounded 
below and is a nonincreasing function of the state of the system) iffthe violation rank of 
<pis equal to the characteristic function of E (up to a constant difference). 
Before we tum to the representation of a PLO FF in a network, we need to discuss the role 
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the energy function plays in neural networks and in a PLOFF. The updating of the 
neurons allows a function, called an energy function, to decrease gradually. The crucial 
aspect of symmetric network models is finding the minima for quadratic functions. This 
paradigm is used for parallel constraint satisfaction. These models are characterised by 
a recurrent network architecture, a symmetric matrix of weights (with zero diagonal) and 
a quadratic energy function that must be minimised. Each node computes the gradient of 
the function and modifies its activation value so that the energy decreases gradually. We 
say that the network reaches equilibrium when the function settles on either a local or 
global minimum. We refer to this state as a stable state (see chapter 4). 
There is a direct mapping between the symmetric networks and the quadratic energy 
functions they minimise. Hence a quadratic energy function can be translated into a 
corresponding network and vice versa. Weighted arcs in the network correspond to 
weighted terms (the weights on the arcs are the coefficients of the terms) of two variables 
in the energy function with opposite sign (see example 5.3 on page 79). Thresholds of 
units in the network correspond to single variable terms in the function. Figure 5.2 is an 
example of a network. Its energy function follows. 
-1 
Figure 5.2 
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This synunetric network represents the function: 
E = -2NT-2ST-2WT+5T+NS+RN-WN+W, where Tis a hidden unit. In [23] Pinkas 
describes a way to convert an energy function to contain no hidden variables. He goes on 
to show that for any such function E with no hidden variables, there exists a 
corresponding satisfiable wff. For the mathematical detail of this conversion procedure, 
we refer the reader to [23]. The corresponding energy function containing no hidden 
variables is E = -NSW +NS +RN - WN +W. 
Now rewriting E yields, NS(l-W) +RN+ (1-N)W. Using the characteristic function we 
have E = HN.•s•. -w + HR,," + H_ "''w' which in turn yields 
H-((N .. S)-W) +H_(R-(-'1)) + H-(NV(-W)) 
Hence the wffis (NJ\S -W) J\ (R-(~N)) J\ (NV(~W)). 
In order to represent an arbitrary logic formula, hidden units or the power of high order 
connections are required in a network. The variables of an energy function can be divided 
into two sets: visible variables and hidden variables. The hidden variables and visible 
variables correspond to the hidden units and the visible units respectively, in the 
network. E(x,t) denotes an energy function with both hidden and visible variables, where 
x represents the visible variables and t represents the hidden variables. An agent is usually 
not interested in the value of the hidden units. However, the visible units are used as 
inputs and outputs, and hence is of interest to the agent. He encodes the input units and 
then observes the values of the output nodes after the training has occurred or after the 
network has settled on a stable state. These values are decoded and interpreted to yield 
an answer. The characteristic function of a network is defined to be ErankE(x) = 
~{E(x,y)}, where the characteristic function is the energy function with the minimum 
number of hidden variables. The ErankE function characterises the network's behavior, 
since it defines the energy of the visible states (that is, the energy level obtained when the 
visible units are assigned the states' values). 
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Getting back to the representation of penalty logic in a symmetric network, we have m 
[23] the following theorem: 
Theorem 5.1 
For every PLO FF q> = { <p., <I>,>} Ii = 1.. .n} there exists a strongly equivalent quadratic 
energy function E(x,t), that is, there exists a constant c such that Vrank~ = ErankE +c. 
This means that a PLOFF q> is equivalent to an energy function E ifthe violation rank of 
q> is equal to the characteristic function of E, i.e. 
('v'x)(Vr~(x) = ErankE(x) + c ). 
The following example shows the equivalence between a PLOFF and the energy function 
it represents. 
Example 5.3 (continued) 
The PLOFF can be written in the form: 
q> ={<3000,T>, <1000,T-H>, <1000,T-R>, <10,R-~W>, <10,H-W>}. 
Each of the pairs is converted to an energy function, which will be a term in the complete 
energy function, which in tum computes the characteristic of the negation of every sub-
formula q>,. For example the negation of the sub-formula ~TVH (i.e. T-H) is ~(~TVH) 
= TA~H. Its characteristic can be written as T(l-H) = T-TH. 
The energy functions associated with the sub-formulas are: 
3000(ET) = 3000(-T) 
I OOO(E_ lVH) = 1 OOO(T-TH) 
IOOO(E_wR) = lOOO(T-TR) 
lO(E-Rv-w) = lO(RW) 
lO(E-HVw) = lO(H-HW) 
Adding the energy terms, we have: E = -lOOOT-lOOOTH-lOOOTR+lORW+lOH-lOHW. 
The negative terms correspond to positive weights and the positive terms correspond to 
negative weights in the network. This is so because the procedure to obtain the energy 
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function includes the computation of the characteristic of the negation of each sub-
formula. The corresponding network is shown in the following figure: 
+10 
-10 
+1000 
Figure 5.3 
-10 
+1000 
+1000 
a 
The network performs a search (which will be discussed in the next section) for a 
preferred model of qi, and hence a search for a preferred theoiy of qi. Inferencing in a 
neural network is viewed as an adaptive process, whereby weights and the activations 
of the nodes are updated according to the learning algorithm. This learning algorithm is 
repeated until some stable condition is reached (in which an optimum solution is 
reached). In a similar way the inference involved in Default logic systems may be viewed 
as an adaptive process [21] which searches for the reasonable belief in going through a 
conflict resolution process. This process was discussed in chapters 2 and 3. The link 
between inferencing in Default logic systems and inferencing in neural networks will be 
pursued further in section 5 .4. 
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We have shown that the extended logic, namely penalty logic, makes it possible to 
represent nonmonotonic knowledge in neural networks. Penalty logic is also able to cope 
with inconsistency in the knowledge base. The equivalence between penalty logic, the 
corresponding energy function E and the symmetric networks has been shown. 
We now describe an arbitraiy connectionist network for simulating Default logic. 
5.4 Simulating Default logic in neural networks 
Given the discussion of default reasoning and related work in nonmonotonic reasoning, 
there is no logical reasoning system that is actually brave enough to discard axioms or 
cancel defaults in order to restore consistency to the knowledge base. In [21] Narazaki 
and Ralescu introduce an approach that accomodates this notion of cancellation. They 
propose a connectionist default inference method. This method consists of three steps: 
1. Detection of a conflict. 
2. Identification and ranking of competing defaults as is done in PLOFF. 
3. Deciding which defaults to cancel, based on the preference theory for 
resolving conflict. 
Before we consider how this inference mechanism is handled in the neural network 
proposed in [21], we will first see how defaults are represented in neural networks. 
S.4.1 Knowledge representation of defaults in neural networks 
Consider the default rule A:B/C. Assume A, B, and C are disjoint in that they do not have 
any common propositions. The rule can be interpreted as : 
~AV (B/\C) V(~B/\ ~C), showing that 
1. If A is true, then either both B and C are true or both B and C are false 
2. If A is false, it does not matter whether B and C are true or false. 
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This can be illustrated by the example that follows. 
Example 5.5 
Summer: ~Rain/Sun_ Shining. If it is true that it is Summer then either it is not raining and 
the sun is shining or it is raining and the sun is not shining. If it is not Summer then, for 
the purposes of this rule, it really does not matter whether it is raining or whether the sun 
is shining. a 
Expanding the above interpretation, yields the following two implications: 
MB -C, MC - B CD 
Note that AAB-C is equivalent to ~(MB)VC = ~AV~BVC and 
A/IC- B is equivalent to ~A v~CV8. Hence we have ( ~AV~8VC) /\ (~A v~CV8) = ~A 
V(~BA~ C)V (8/\C), which is equivalent to the original interpretation. 
Using the translation rule in CD we can do the same for a normal default rule and a 
seminormal default rule. Applying the translation rule to the normal default rule A:B/B 
yields the implication MB - B, and applying the rule to the seminormal default rule 
A:B/\C/C yields the implications AA 8/\C - C, and MC - B/\C. The implications 
obtained from normal and seminormal defaults contain a tautology, that is, a wffthat is 
true under every possible assignment of truth values. Generally our thinking process is 
concerned with resolving possible conflicts caused by default knowledge and the method 
of cancelling defaults based on our preference is used to resolve the conflicts. Quantifiers 
such as, 'most', 'all', 'at least' and 'usually', can be used as clues for our preference. 
However, the tautology obtained using CD does not express a preference (i.e. believe q as 
far as situations allow). The absence of quantifiers make it difficult to determine a 
preference. In [21] Narazaki and Ralescu cope with this problem by introducing a meta 
variable f - a variable that is not actually part of the reasoning mechanism, but is used to 
aid the reasoning process. The meta variable is used to get rid of the tautology. The 
justification B is replaced by the meta variable f. The normal default A:8/8 is now 
changed to A:f/B, and the translation rule in CV is applied to yield 
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Mf-B and MB-f. @ 
In the same manner the seminormal default A:B/\C/C is modified to yield 
A:B/\f/C. Applying the translation rule in <!l yields the following implications: 
Al\ B/\f-C and MC-B/\f. @ 
We have (M B/\f-C)/\ (MC-B/\f) = ~AV (~B/\~C)V(~f/\~C)V(C/\ f /\ B). In other 
words f divides the beliefs into two parts. 
Now that we are able to represent the default rules in the form of wffs using meta 
variables, defaut rules can be mapped into a neural network using the approach of 
Penalty logic. 
5.4.2 Connectionist inference mechanism 
The network inference method proposed in [21] is based on the concept of simultaneous 
constraint satisfaction. Based on the Hopfield neural network, which is generally suited 
to solve optimization problems, the knowledge is translated into constraints and the 
energy function is defined as the sum of the constraint violations. The constraints 
correspond to the conflicting propositions. In order to reduce the extent of constraint 
violations a relaxation process is employed. This process updates the truth value 
distribution to decrease the energy, and to restore a more stable state. You may refer to 
the discussion of this in chapter 4. A detail account of the inference method follows. 
The inference mechanism consists of two processes: the network mechanism and 
the logical mechanism. The network mechanism implements a relaxation method, which 
will be discussed later, and the logical mechanism resolves any conflict that might occur 
based on the network state. The nodes of the network are classified into three kinds of 
nodes, namely 
I. constraint nodes, which represent constraint equations, 
2. proposition nodes, which represent facts, and 
3. one global node which controls the solution. 
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When we speak of a problem, we mean finding (i.e. deriving ) a conclusion amidst the 
axioms and default knowledge available, or finding the 'best' solution, as in the classical 
Travelling Salesman Problem. The solution obtained would be interpreted from a 
graphical perspective. Hence the solution can be a local solution or a global solution. A 
local solution is when we find one rule of which the premise is satisfied, we assert that 
the consequent is true without taking into consideration the effect of other rules. A global 
solution is a macroscopic solution where the entire knowledge base or network is 
considered. We will refer to the global solution as a feasible solution. When a feasible 
solution is reached, the truth value distribution makes the energy 0. This would 
correspond to a consistent belief. However, if the energy attains a positive minimum 
value it is said to have a local solution, which is not satisfactory. The local solution is not 
indicative of the interactions of all other rules available. 
The relaxation process searches for a solution. If a local solution is achieved, then the 
value of the global node goes to infinity, and when an upper limit (user-defined) of the 
global node is exceeded, then a kind of confusion is triggered which allows the network 
to get out of the local solution. A snapshot (the value of each node and the weight on each 
of the arcs) of the state of the network when a solution (feasible or local) is reached, is 
sent to the logical mechanism. The logical mechanism performs the task of controlling 
the search process based on the snapshot of the network it received. Because of the 
uncertainty (inconsistency) of the knowledge base, the truth values are allowed to be 
fuzzy or continuous in the range (0, I]. The truth value is updated based on the gradient 
information of a proposition. The gradient information of a proposition x is given by 
<j>(x) = f: Pi ei (oei /ox), where Pi is the weight (penalty) and ei is a constraint 
J"l 
violation of the jth piece of knowledge. For a fact whose truth value is fixed, the gradient 
is zero. Many solutions to a problem are possible and we need to find a preferred 
solution. In order to find this preferred solution the relaxation process is iterated and each 
time the initial truth values are changed. It is, however, not possible to know when all 
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solutions have been found. Also, if the relaxation process keeps finding local solutions, 
it is not possible to know whether a feasible solution really exists or whether more time 
is required to find this feasible solution. Therefore the time required to continue the 
search must be determined heuristically (using rules of thumb which are not necessarily 
true but are helpful guides to finding solutions). A preference criterion is required to order 
the solutions. The penalty logic developed earlier uses the minimality of the constraint 
violations as such a criterion. The preference criterion can be a function that maps a truth 
value distribution to a scalar value. The network mechanism concentrates on providing 
the logical mechanism with the network's state, whilst the logical mechanism orders and 
selects the best solution. Because the search time required is heuristic in nature, the 
network makes use of a motivation function m(t) to help determine the search time 
necessary. This function may be defined as m(t) = e·•t, where t indicates the number of 
times the relaxation process was applied since the current best solution was obtained, and 
a > O is a parameter that controls the waiting time. If the best solution is a feasible 
solution, m(t) - 0 indicates that the relaxation process converges to a model or preferred 
theory. The built-in program decodes the truth values of the proposition and constraint 
nodes to a user-understandable interpretation and hence a solution is found. 
A conceptual diagram [22] of the inference mechanism follows. 
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Neural Network 
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Figure 5.4 
Constraint nodes: These nodes correspond to the constraints expressed by rules 
and general constraints. They are connected to the related 
proposition nodes. The built-in program calculates the 
amount of constraint violation. 
Propositional nodes:These nodes are connected to the related constraint nodes. The 
built-in program updates the truth value associated with a 
proposition node. 
Global node: This node is connected to all the constraint and proposition 
nodes to transmit global information like the maximum 
constraint violation. 
Next we need a strategy to resolve conflict. Narazaki and Ralescu discuss this strategy, 
using meta-relaxation. This is the topic of the next section. 
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5.4.3 Conflict resolution strategies using meta-relaxation 
If there are n defaults then there will be n meta variables in the belief set. We recall from 
chapter 2 that the applicability of a default depends on whether the prerequisite is ttue 
and whether the justification is consistent with the belief set. The translation of the 
defaults to wffs using meta variables as described in paragraph 5.4.1, indicates that the 
meta variable replaces the justification (or patt thereof). Therefore the justification which 
is now the meta vmiable must be true. Hence the new fotm of the defaults written as wffs 
require the meta variable to be ttue in order that the defaults be applicable. Another 
constraint equation indicating the maximum number of propositions that can be 
n 
completely true, is given in the form L V(f;) =I, where V(f;) denotes the truth value of 
i=l 
meta variables f; in {0,1}. In this approach the truth values are allowed to be fuzzy, i.e. 
somewhere in [O, l]. However it is possible to keep to ttuth values in { 0, I} using an 
integer programming approach. I will denote the sum of the truth values of f;, thus 
showing the number of applicable defaults (f; is the meta variable used in the default). A 
process to decrease the number (I) of completely true defaults is required, so that the 
possibility of conflict(s) in the cunent belief set may be reduced. This process is a meta-
relaxation process which is iterated until the conflict is resolved. Before the meta-
relaxation is perfotmed, a relaxation process, called object level relaxation is required. 
This relaxation process updates truth values of propositions under the given value of!. 
Only those defaults that conespond to the meta variables in the conflict set are 
considered. If a solution is not likely to appear (i.e solution is local), it requires the 
motivation function and the meta-relaxation is implemented to decrease I. Then the 
object level relaxation is performed again, starting with a decreased !. This process of 
object level relaxation and meta-relaxation is iterated until a feasible solution is found. 
Note that the relaxation process is really the lemning algorithm required by the network. 
The key idea is to minimize the number of cancellations. Remember the reason for 
cancellations is to resolve conflicts. The meta-relaxation is perf01med by the logical 
mechanism. The three steps involved are: 
l. A decision is made regarding the existence of a feasible solution. This is done via 
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the motivation function m(t), discussed earlier. 
2. If it is not possible to find a feasible solution then a conflict set is extracted from 
the best local solution. At this point it is not known which defaults are causing the 
conflicts. A set such as F ={ fk; ~ > E0 } is called a conflict set, where zk is a constraint 
violation for the default associated with fk (the meta variable used in the justification 
of the default) and E0 is a threshold that is user-defined. This set contains all the meta 
variables fk of the local best solution. 
3. Defaults corresponding to fk in the set F are then removed to resolve the conflict. In 
other words the meta variable fk corresponding to a default is removed from the conflict 
set F. This is done in two steps: setting V(t;) = O and decrementing I by one. 
There are a number of cancellation strategies that Narazaki and Ralescu propose. I will 
not discuss these strategies in this dissertation. For details the reader can refer to [21]. 
The strategy used is dependent on the type of application. 
Let us illustrate the use of defaults in a neural network by an example taken from [21]. 
Example 5.6 
Consider the following rules (denoted by R,, i = 1, ... , 7) and their corresponding defaults 
(R1, ... , R5 ) and axioms (R,; and R7 ). 
R 1: Usually things do not fly. 
R2: Usually birds fly. 
R3: Penguins don't fly. 
Thing(x):~Fly(x) 
~Fly(x) 
Bird(x) : Fly(x) 
Fly(x) 
Penguin(x):~Fly( x) 
----------------------~ Fly(x) 
R4: Caddy seems to be a Penguin. Caddy(x):Penguin(x) 
------------------------Penguin( x) 
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RS: Birds usually eat insects. Bird(x): Eat lnsects(x) 
Eat lnsects(x) 
R6: Birds are things. Bird(x) - Thing(x) 
R7: Penguins are birds. Penguin(x) - Bird(x) 
Applying the translation rule in CD (page 82) to the defaults and replacing the justification 
part of the default rule by meta variables, yield the following implications: 
RI: Thing(x) /\fi - ~Fly(x), Thing(x) /\ ~F/y(x) - t; 
R2: Bird(x) /\ (, - Fly(x), Bird(x)/\Fly(x) -J; 
R3 Penguin(x) /\/,- ~Fly(x), Penguin(x)/\ ~Fly(x)- f, 
R4: Caddy(x) /\/, - Penguin(x), Caddy(x) /\ Penguin(x) - /, 
RS: Bird(x) /\ Is - EatJnsect(x), Bird(x) /\ Eat_Insect(x) - Is 
R6: Bird(x) - Thing(x) 
R7: Penguin(x) - Bird(x) 
We consider R6 and R7 to be facts. 
We assign a truth value of l to Caddy, i.e. V(Caddy) = l and we set V(f,) = l for i= 
1,2, .. ,S. All the defaults are used. In this case there would be no feasible solution because 
alt five defaults cannot be true at the same time, although the individual statements make 
sense. (All the defaults are pait of the conflict set F). A conflict occurs in determining 
whether Caddy flies or not. According to R4 Caddy is a penguin, and R3 states that 
penguins do not fly and at the same time we know that penguins are birds and by R2 
birds should fly. We can either choose R3 and therefore say that Caddy cannot fly and 
cancel R2, i.e. birds fly, or we may doubt that Caddy is actually a penguin, cancelling 
R4 and in the process conclude that Caddy flies. From this we notice that we make a 
choice depending on our preference. Also the person who is not familiar with penguins 
would prefer cancelling R3 and R4, i.e. penguins do not fly. This person may never 
cancel R3 again if convinced that penguins do not fly. This indicates that a preference is 
a result of a learning mechanism. D 
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Since there is no feasible solution because I= 5, a meta-relaxation is perfotmed. 
N arazaki and Ralescu propose a number of strategies that can be used in determining 
which defaults should be cancelled. Some of the strategies they use are Free Srrategy, 
Preference Oracle, Specificity Strategy and Object Level Strategy. In this dissettation we 
will discuss one of these, namely object level strategy. 
Obiect level strategy 
We start this discussion by defining the specificity index of a proposition. 
Definition 5.6 
The specificity index of a proposition is given by S(p) = I V(p) - 0.5 I , where V(p) 
indicates the truth value of p. 
The specificity index is calculated for all propositions having variable truth values as in 
RI to R5 in example 5.6 above. R6 and R7 are facts therefore their truth values are fixed 
at one. The proposition (p) that has the highest specificity index after each relaxation 
process is identified and then the truth value of p is set. The process of implementing the 
relaxation process, the identification of the proposition with the highest specificity index 
and setting the truth value of the proposition, is iterated. This iterative procedure results 
in reducing the conflict set F. The defaults that correspond to the remaining meta 
variables fk in F are cancelled. In this case Penguin(x), Fly(x), Thing(x), Eat_ lnsect(x) 
and Bird(x) are in tum fixed to either 0 or 1, so these values are not fuzzy. The conflict 
set F eventually has only one default, i.e. "Birds fly" and therefore the cancellation of R2 
is in order. 
We will discuss another example and see how the inference method proposed in [21] can 
deal with interacting pieces of knowledge. 
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Example 5.7 (taken from [21]) 
Consider a basic air-conditioner (AC) problem. We assume that the AC is able to heat 
and cool the air in the room by selecting the appropriate mode, ie. Heat mode (HM) and 
Cool mode (CM). The AC operates according to the following mies: 
I. If AC is switched on and the HM is turned on then warm air will be emitted. 
2. ff AC is switched on and the CM is turned on then cool air will be emitted. 
3. The AC is turned on with either the "cool mode"on or the "heat mode" on, i.e. 
CMVHM. 
We now transfmm the above knowledge into defaults and wff(s) as follows: 
AC: warm!\ ~CM/warm, AC: cool!\~ HM/cool, CMV HM. 
It may be erroneously concluded that both warm and cool air are emitted if the 
interactions among defaults are not properly dealt with. We observe that if the first 
default is used, its justification ~CM should block the application of the second default 
because of the wffCMVHM. To prevent the en·oneous conclusion that "watm and cool" 
air come out, the defaults are translated using meta variables;; andf, as follows: 
AC!\f; !\ ~CM - warm, AC!\ warm - ft !\~CM 
AC!\.fi !\~HM - cool, AC!\ cool - h. !\~HM 
According to the inference mechanism, ft andfz are set to I (ttue). The object level 
relaxation yields one of the following possible solutions: warm!\~ cool, ~warm!\ cool, 
or ~warm!\~cool. The last solution can be avoided by replacing the wffCMVHM with 
CM Xor HM where Xor denotes an "exclusive or". a 
Many types of reasoning can be viewed in tetms of constraint satisfaction problems 
(CSP). Examples of such reasoning are temporal reasoning [4), truth maintenance [6) and 
diagnostic reasoning [SJ. We have seen that constraint satisfaction problems can be 
modelled in neural networks. Default reasoning which is closely linked to diagnostic 
reasoning can also be viewed in terms of CSP. From all that has been discussed so far it 
92 
would seem that if P is in some extension of the default theory involved then p would be 
one of the solutions obtained in a neural network. In chapter 3, paragraph 3.3 we 
discussed the undecidability of the proof theory of Default logic. In contrast, the neural 
network approach will always yield a solution if it exists. 
5.5 Conclusion 
Penalty logic has been developed by Pinkas [23] as a platform to represent nonmonotonic 
knowledge. Pinkas' theory involves capturing the framework ofnonmonotonic logic in 
a neural network, using penalty logic. It has been shown that for every Penalty logic 
formula there is an equivalent energy function, which can be represented in a symmetric 
connectionist network. 
Narazaki and Ralescu [21] show a way of representing Default logic in a neural network. 
Their approach is one in which default rules are translated into implications which are in 
turn converted to formulas of ordinary logic. Just as ordinary logic can be mapped into 
a neural network so too defaults (with the necessary conversion) can be represented in a 
neural network. In the case of resolving conflict, defaults are cancelled based on a 
pieference, which is built into the neural network. 
This brings us to the completion of this final chapter. In this dissertation we have 
provided an exposition of Default logic together with a proof theory for Default logic. 
We have presented a proof theory for Default logic based on prioritised conflict 
resolution and it has been shown that Default logic can be mapped in a neural network. 
In order to deal with the inference in a conflicting situation, the inference problem was 
shifted from the logical problem to the optimisation problem, in which maximum 
consistency is aimed at. The inference mechanism presented is an adaptive inference that 
is capable of cancelling defaults in order to resolve conflict(s). It has been found that the 
continuous Hopfield network is appropriate in modelling default reasoning. The power 
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of the Hopfield network lies in its parallelism. In addition to this parallelism, a relaxation 
method was presented that can cope efficiently with the interactions among knowledge. 
A typical optimisation problem, the TSP, has been presented to demonstrate the theory. 
The selection between the possible answers it might give, shows the power of the 
computation a neural network is capable of. The proposed mechanism simulates an 
"intuitive" part of the thinking process. However, further research is required to 
investigate a "conscious" part of the thinking process, which is referred to as the logical 
mechanism that works on snapshots of the network state. This might aid in the 
implementation of complex default reasoning in neural networks. 
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